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The Foreign Policy Domain tracks and reports on policies that deal with US treaty obligations, relations with other countries, engagement with international organizations, and trade policies. The domain tracks policies emanating from the White House, the Department of State, United States Agency for International Development, Office of the US Trade Representative, and Office of the US Representative to the United Nations.

Latest Foreign Policy Posts


The Past & Present of the American Relationship with Iran

Brief #92—Foreign Policy
By Will Solomon
While not as omnipresent as it often has been, the issue of conflict with Iran should loom large in the context of the 2020 election. Indeed, it’s important to consider just how much more serious this issue has grown in the last four years. A central premise of Trump’s 2016 campaign was exiting the 2015 JCPOA— perhaps the single biggest foreign policy achievement of the Obama administration.

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Trump and Putin: A Kremlin Arranged Marriage

Brief #89—Foreign Policy
By Brandon Mooney
Unless you’ve had your head buried in the sand for the past month, you have no doubt heard about the controversy surrounding whether Trump had been briefed on intelligence claiming that Russia offered bounties to the Taliban in Afghanistan for the targeting and killing of U.S. servicemen.

read more
Nuclear Proliferation in the Year 2020

Nuclear Proliferation in the Year 2020

Policy Summary:

Perhaps the gravest danger of nuclear proliferation today is the invisibility of the problem. As it stands, the United States officially has about 5800 nuclear weapons. Russia has about 6400. China has about 300. Six other states possess nuclear weapons; several others may be attempting to acquire them.

And yet the days of the Cold War are long gone. No more shelter-in-place drills, no more hiding under desks, no more fallout shelters. Culturally, the threat and fear of mass nuclear violence have largely dissipated—aside from occasional flare-ups surrounding “rogue states” like North Korea, or broad fears of nuclear terrorism. But all said, the risk of nuclear conflict is as serious as ever—perhaps the most serious it has ever been, given the lack of public awareness of the problem, modernization and proliferation of weapons, the caliber of the leaders currently in power, and the crumbling international framework for managing arms control.

To begin with the last point: a long series of nuclear arms control agreements began in the early days of the Cold War. This notably included the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and numerous others—some between the United States and USSR, and some with an international framework.

The limitations of the treaties have been clear. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was never ratified by India, Pakistan, and Israel, all of which ultimately acquired nuclear weapons. The central premise of the treaty—that non-nuclear states would not pursue development of nuclear weapons, as nuclear states pursue eventual disarmament—has not been met with any serious progress towards disarmament by the major nuclear weapons states, the United States included.

Perhaps more urgently, landmark agreements between the US/USSR (and later Russian Federation) have been allowed to expire, or have been abandoned. The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which limited anti-ballistic missile capabilities between the two states, lapsed in 2002, when the Bush Administration exited the agreement. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was abandoned by the US, then Russia, in 2019. The last remaining US-Russia nuclear weapons treaty, New START—signed in 2009—may expire in 2021, largely due to the unwillingness of the Trump Administration to renew it.

A related issue has been modernization of the nuclear arsenals. In the United States, this began as a $1 trillion plan under the Obama Administration, and includes submarine, bomber, and missile upgrades, as well as new deployments of so-called “low-yield”—and thus, theoretically more “usable”—nuclear weapons. Russia has also pursued modernizations, including hypersonic weapons.

Finally, it ought to be noted that smaller but potentially apocalyptic nuclear flash points remain, such as between India and Pakistan. Both are nuclear states with regular border clashes and aggressive—and particularly in India’s case, extremely nationalistic—governments. Other states, like Iran, do not currently have nuclear weapons, but may be on the path to acquiring them.


The United States is not the only international actor when it comes to nuclear proliferation, but it is by far the most significant. The US remains the only nation ever to have used a nuclear weapon in war. Despite ongoing American decline, its status as a superpower, and the enormity of its arsenal, necessitate American involvement in serious international efforts to reduce proliferation. Ideally, this would involve bilateral arms control agreements with Russia, a halt to American nuclear modernization plans, some sort of multilateral mediation at specific conflict sites (including a real defusing of tensions with states like North Korea), and a true move towards nuclear disarmament.

Of course, the Trump Administration has repeatedly demonstrated that it regards international diplomacy as, at best, a nuisance. Trump has personally demonstrated an erratic fascination with nuclear weapons and his administration has shown an utter lack of interest in any efforts to reduce nuclear proliferation. Indeed, its policies in Iran have significantly heightened the probability of that country developing nuclear weapons. Relatedly, there is evidence that Saudi Arabia is potentially pursuing nuclear weapons, possibly with US assent.

To address this, it must be kept in mind that American unilateralism as regards nuclear weapons has been a largely bipartisan policy with a long history. It was the Bush Administration that exited the ABM, and the Obama Administration that agreed to an enormous modernization of the nuclear arsenal. That said, much of the effectiveness of arms control in the past was also broadly bipartisan, and more importantly, instigated by mass public pressure. If the current path is to be altered, the urgency surrounding eliminating nuclear weapons must be renewed.


  • https://kingsbayplowshares7.org — Members of the Kings Bay Plowshares 7 are due to be sentenced for a non-violent, anti-nuclear action—dating to 4/4/2018—during which they entered the Kings Bay Naval Submarine Base to stage an anti-nuclear protest. Read about the case and donate at the links above.
  • https://www.armscontrol.org — “The Arms Control Association, founded in 1971, is a national nonpartisan membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies.”
  • https://thebulletin.org — “The Bulletin equips the public, policymakers, and scientists with the information needed to reduce man-made threats to our existence.”
The Past & Present of the American Relationship with Iran

The Past & Present of the American Relationship with Iran

Policy Summary:
While not as omnipresent as it often has been, the issue of conflict with Iran should loom large in the context of the 2020 election. Indeed, it’s important to consider just how much more serious this issue has grown in the last four years. A central premise of Trump’s 2016 campaign was exiting the 2015 JCPOA— perhaps the single biggest foreign policy achievement of the Obama administration. Beginning on May 8, 2018, Trump made good on this threat, officially withdrawing from the agreement. Tensions with Iran have grown steadily since. The start of 2020 saw the assassination of Iranian General Qassem Suleimani at Baghdad International Airport, a major escalation of the conflict. Most recently, on September 19, 2020, the United States unilaterally attempted to reimpose all pre-JCPOA UN sanctions on Iran. (This includes a conventional arms embargo on Iran, among other prohibitions). While the efficacy of these sanctions are somewhat limited by the sheer exhaustion of sanctions already placed on Iran, coupled with the international community’s opposition to the sanctions, the United States still wields considerable power to hassle other countries and companies that do attempt to do business with Iran.

Any discussion of American-Iranian diplomacy must take into account the long and contentious history of relations between the two countries. In 1953, a CIA-backed coup overthrew the popularly elected Iranian prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddeq, primarily over American and British objections to his nationalization of the British Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (later, British Petroleum). Mosaddeq was replaced by Shah Reza Pahlavi, whose often-brutal reign was financially and militarily supported by the United States until he was overthrown in the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

Though less well-remembered (at least in the United States), American efforts to destabilize Iran were amplified after the Islamic Revolution and concurrent hostage crisis. September 2020 marks the 40th anniversary of the start of the Iran-Iraq War, which began after Saddam Hussein invaded Iran. The war, ultimately the longest conventional war of the 20th century, was brutal for both sides, but particularly Iran. Although the United States played the two countries off each other during the war (Henry Kissinger famously said: “it’s a pity both sides can’t lose”), US sympathies were definitively with Saddam, and the US assisted him with targeting, weapons sales, and other logistical support. Perhaps most egregiously, in 1988, the United States missile cruiser Vincennes, stationed in the Persian Gulf, shot down Iranian Air Flight 655, killing all 290 passengers aboard. And finally, lest it be forgotten—it was widely believed that an American overthrow of Iran would be the sequel to the American invasion of Iraq. Iran was listed, along with Iraq and North Korea, in Bush’s famous “Axis of Evil” speech, and it is likely only the quagmire in Iraq that prevented the Bush Administration from taking this second step.

Today Iran is  a regional power, and heavily isolated by America and its regional allies (particularly Israel and the Arab Gulf States). Predictably, because of American withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iran has stopped complying with the terms of the agreement and has begun to expand its enriched uranium stockpile. 


Trump appears to have little understanding of or interest in how his actions will destabilize the Greater Middle East. Despite implicit and explicit promises to end American involvement in the region, with regards to Iran he has dramatically escalated the potential for mass conflict. While Trump’s opinions may often be unformed and fickle, he continues to be advised by a number of long-time Iran hawks, like Mike Pompeo.

It hardly bears restating, but it should be emphasized that even a regional war would be devastating to all parties involved, particularly to Iranian citizens and other civilians in the region. The odds of a large-scale ground war and invasion—as with Iraq—seem low, but the prospect of a devastating air war, with serious Iranian resistance, remains quite possible. It is worth bearing in mind that at least several hundred thousand Iraqis died as a result of the American-led invasion in 2003, and the body count may well exceed one million.

It should also be noted that despite its weaknesses from years of sanctions and isolation, Iran remains a strong country with a multi-millennia history. Iran is not in the position Iraq was in in 2003 (and arguably, Iran’s position has been strengthened by the US destruction of Iraq). Iran would be quite capable of mounting a major defense, directly and through proxies, like Hezbollah.

Finally—aside from making it extremely difficult, logistically, for a hypothetical Biden administration to re-enter the Iran deal, the Trump administration has created the possibly more severe problem of utterly shredding American credibility vis-à-vis international treaties. Why should Iran (or North Korea, or Venezuela, etc.) sign any treaty with an American administration if the next one can rip it up? Trump and those surrounding him evidently care little about this in the pursuit of their own agenda.

As tensions remain extremely high, and particularly as the election approaches, it is also worth noting that for decades Iran has been portrayed as an aggressor in US media and by the vast majority of Republicans and Democrats. However even a cursory reading of regional history shows that Iran has far more often been the victim of geopolitical machinations by America and Western powers. All in all, Iran has reacted as a rational state actor, while the absurdity of the Trump administration’s approach has increasingly demonstrated that the United States is acting as a rogue state; and the long trail that has led to this moment was paved by a bipartisan consensus in Washington. It is imperative that those looking for change through the US domestic political process remember this.

Resistance Resources:

  • https://ploughshares.org — “For over 39 years Ploughshares Fund has supported the most effective people and organizations in the world to reduce and eventually eliminate the dangers posed by nuclear weapons.”
  • https://www.codepink.org — “CODEPINK is a women-led grassroots organization working to end U.S. wars and militarism, support peace and human rights initiatives, and redirect our tax dollars into healthcare, education, green jobs and other life-affirming programs.”
  • https://aboutfaceveterans.org — “We are Post-9/11 service members and veterans organizing to end a foreign policy of permanent war and the use of military weapons, tactics, and values in communities across the country.”
US Relations with Latin American and The 2019 Bolivian Coup d’État

US Relations with Latin American and The 2019 Bolivian Coup d’État


US intervention in Latin American politics extends back almost to the founding of this country, predating even the Monroe Doctrine. Overt interventions in the 19th and early 20th centuries included the Mexican-American War, Spanish-American War, Banana Wars, and many others. These interventions evolved into slightly more covert but equally, if not more, violent interventions during the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. This has included countless US-backed coups, training and support for right-wing paramilitaries, an over half-century long effort to destabilize Cuba, and innumerable other cases. It is in this context that we must evaluate the American relationship with Bolivia, particularly in light of the coup d’état that occurred in that country last year.

Bolivia serves as an especially interesting case because, in the space of days, the country transitioned (non-democratically) from a left-leaning, socially-democratic, Indigenous-led government to a far-right, overtly Christian one. This rapid change was only mildly and briefly noted in most of the US press, despite the clear undemocratic nature of the shift and the violent repression in the country that accompanied it.

The immediate situation went as follows: in October 2019, Evo Morales ran for a fourth term as President of Bolivia. Morales was the first Indigenous leader of the majority-Indigenous nation and his years in power were characterized by broad economic advancement for the poorest citizens of the country (among many notable statistics, the proportion of Bolivians living in extreme poverty went from 36% to 17% during Morales’ time in office). Morales was one of a handful of left-leaning leaders elected in Latin America in the 2000s, including Luis Inacio Lula da Silva in Brazil and Rafael Correa in Ecuador. Despite some criticism for standing for a fourth term, Morales remained broadly popular and was the favorite to win last year’s election.

Indeed, as votes were being tabulated, it became clear Morales would win and the only question was by how much (Bolivian law requires a 10% margin of victory, plus winning over 40% of the vote, to avoid a second-round run-off). Before the election had been called, however, the Organization of American States, who was monitoring the election, alleged with little evidence that there were counting irregularities and declared the vote fraudulent. The Trump administration and prominent Republicans like Marco Rubio (and numerous Democrats) came out against Morales. Despite his agreeing to new elections, on November 10, the military publicly demanded Morales’ resignation, and he fled the country. After his ouster, right-wing, white Christian Senator Jeanine Añez appointed herself interim president. Meanwhile, mass protests by the Morales’ base, following the coup, triggered a brutal state crackdown, in which at least several dozen of his supporters have been killed.

Despite a lack of procedural legitimacy, Añez remains president today, and new elections have thus far been postponed twice. Notably, a study earlier this year by MIT’s Election Data and Science Lab determined that last year’s election was indeed fair.


How does the US fit in amidst this? Clearly, its early denouncement of Morales and support for the OAS lent confidence to the right-wing political and military forces that ultimately initiated the coup d’état. The OAS has a long history of domination by Washington, and specifically, in intervening in elections seen as unfavorable to the United States (Haiti in 2000 and 2010 are two recent examples). The US press also played a supportive role by downplaying the military’s role in overthrowing Morales and over-emphasizing perceived antidemocratic tendencies by Morales himself. Perhaps above all, like other left-wing Latin American leaders, Morales had long been a thorn in Washington’s side, and there was clearly an eagerness among US leaders to see him go.

It is too early to know with any certainty whether Washington had inside knowledge of or involvement with the acute effort to remove Morales, but it has been widely suggested that Bolivia’s vast lithium reserves—essential to electric car batteries—lent significant impetus to Western support for a change in government. Indeed, Morales had cancelled a contract with a German lithium mining company, ACISA, only a week before the coup took place, after mass protests from local residents.

Despite Trump’s “America First” isolationist bluster, the United States continues to remain a violently destabilizing actor around the world. The administration’s actions in relation to countries as far-flung as Iran, Yemen, Venezuela—and here, Bolivia—have served to exacerbate regional tensions and, in many cases, intensify American involvement in the affairs of these nations. In this case, it is the people of Bolivia who will suffer most.

Learn More










Resistance Resources 

https://www.codepink.org — “CODEPINK is a women-led grassroots organization working to end U.S. wars and militarism, support peace and human rights initiatives, and redirect our tax dollars into healthcare, education, green jobs and other life-affirming programs.”

https://amazonwatch.org/about — “Amazon Watch is a nonprofit organization founded in 1996 to protect the rainforest and advance the rights of Indigenous peoples in the Amazon Basin. We partner with Indigenous and environmental organizations in campaigns for human rights, corporate accountability and the preservation of the Amazon’s ecological systems.”

https://www.internationalpolicy.org — “The Center for International Policy (CIP) works to make a peaceful, just and sustainable world the central pursuit of U.S. foreign policy.  We promote cooperation, transparency and accountability in the international relations of the United States. Through research and advocacy, our programs offer common sense solutions to address the most urgent threats to our planet: war, corruption, inequality and climate change.”

What’s the Accord Between Israel and the United Arab Emirates All About?

What’s the Accord Between Israel and the United Arab Emirates All About?



On August 31, flight LY971 landed in the United Arab Emirates after a three-hour journey from Israel. The touchdown acted as a seal of approval on the Abraham Accord, the agreement to normalize relations between the two countries. The deal was brokered by the Trump administration behind closed doors and announced suddenly on August 13.

The accord was hinted at in the Emirati ambassador to the United States Yousef Al Otaiba’s op-ed in Israel’s largest daily newspaper, Yedioth Ahronoth, in which the diplomat decried Israel’s plans to annex parts of the West Bank and offered the suggestion of diplomatic normalization as an alternative. Al Otaiba’s hopes for greater economic ties and security cooperation came to fruition: Israel suspended the planned annexation, while the Emirati government in Abu Dhabi signed the Abraham Accord into law. The Trump administration joined national newspapers in both signatory nations in pronouncing the agreement a historic step towards peace in the Middle East. The UAE is now only the third Arab government to normalize relations with Israel, after Egypt and Jordon.

Yet despite the fanfare, the Palestinian Authority and civil society throughout the Middle East have roundly criticized the deal for breaking the consensus in the Arab world that no country unilaterally sign a peace treaty with Israel.

And the deal was indeed unilateral — the Emirati government did not clue in any other Arab nation to its plans, abstaining even from inviting the Palestinian Authority or any other body representing the Palestinian people to the negotiations. Thus, an agreement that ostensible hinged on Israel halting its annexation of Palestinian-occupied land completely blindsided Palestinian leadership. Pro-peace movements view the move in bad faith and believe that the outcome of the Abraham Accord is at best ineffective and at worst harmful to the Arab world’s stated goals of a two-state solution and a lasting peace in the Middle East. Nour Odeg, a Palestinian writer and analyst, is quoted in the New York Times as writing that Abu Dhabi, “tried to use us as a fig leaf…Nobody buys it…Palestine did not factor into this.”


While this accord was sold to onlookers as a way of defending the Palestinian people from Israeli annexation efforts, the facts on the ground show that peace in the West Bank was, at best, an afterthought. This was an act of convenience for the signatories parties as well as for the Trump Administration, which used the accord to support two regimes friendly with the president, while ignoring the root of a conflict that was supposed to be center stage in the negotiations.

The deal was marketed as an accomplishment as great as the Israeli treaties with Egypt and Jordon, one that would bring peace to the Middle East, and yet it failed to accomplish any of its stated goals. This accord, while certainly a major shift in regional politics, is in no way relatable to the aforementioned peace deals, which marked the end of armed conflicts. In addition, the deal does little to address the root of the conflict it set out to resolve, with Israel showing little desire to negotiate with any Palestinian organization. Mairav Zonszein is quoted in the Jerusalem Post as pointing out that the Abraham Accord is Isreal’s attempt to sign a peace agreement with a country it was not at war with, “while continuing to occupy millions of Palestinians.”

The Emirati demand to halt Israel’s annexation plans was granted, though the plans had already long been stalled by recently-indicted Prime Minister Netanyahu’s waning political heft while he awaits the fourth election in a single year, following three contested results. In addition, poignant Brookings Institute analysis suggests that Netanyahu is surely keeping an eye on the upcoming US presidential election, with full knowledge that going forward with the planned annexation would potentially sour relations with a new, anti-annexation Biden-Harris administration. The UAE’s demands acted as an excuse for Israel to put a pause on an already drawn-out and internationally unpopular policy while appeasing hardliners within the country. With a window into regional markets, security cooperation and diplomacy with the Arab world on the table in return for simply maintaining the status quo, Israel got a whole lot more than they gave.

The UAE proclaimed their support of Palestine while using them as a justification to sign the Abraham Accord, unilaterally moving the goalpost for rapprochement with Israel from “when Palestine is liberated” to “when Israel pauses its current annexation plans.” The fact that Abu Dhabi has been inching towards normalization with Israel for years coupled with the lingering question about why they never consulted with the Palestinian Authority about their plans makes it clear that true peace between Israel and the Palestinians wasn’t exactly on the forefront of their mind.

As for the Trump administration, the salesmanship around the issue clearly points to the president’s plans to use the accord as a tagline in his reelection campaign. Branding a coming-together of two conservative, Trump-friendly administrations that leaves Palestinian civil liberties and self-determination out of the conversation as “peace in the Middle East” is the same kind of misdirection we have seen from this presidency on countless domestic and foreign policies throughout the last four years. While Arab-Israeli rapprochement could do wonders for developing soft diplomacy in the region, critics are right to worry that by leaving Palestinians outside the negotiations in such a supposedly historic treaty, and one that affects them so directly, sets a bad precedent for future negotiations.

As the broker of this accord, it was the Trump-administration’s solemn duty to use this opportunity to progress true peace in the Middle East. Instead, the president kicked the can down the road. The outcome of this agreement highlights the fact that president’s foreign policy is based on supporting governments over people, and that his administration is in no rush to address the underlying causes of regional instability as long as his allies come out on top. With so many Americans working tirelessly to address similar trends in the president’s domestic policies, it can be easy to overlook the damage done to the international landscape. Yet it is more vital now than ever to build solidarity between social movements and across borders to defend the decency of those lives ignored by authoritarian and reactionary governments.

Resistance Resources:

Trump and Putin: A Kremlin Arranged Marriage

Trump and Putin: A Kremlin Arranged Marriage

By Brandon Mooney 

August 4, 2020

Unless you’ve had your head buried in the sand for the past month, you have no doubt heard about the controversy surrounding whether Trump had been briefed on intelligence claiming that Russia offered bounties to the Taliban in Afghanistan for the targeting and killing of U.S. servicemen.

Policy Summary:

Unless you’ve had your head buried in the sand for the past month, you have no doubt heard about the controversy surrounding whether Trump had been briefed on intelligence claiming that Russia offered bounties to the Taliban in Afghanistan for the targeting and killing of U.S. servicemen. With more right-wing news sources and the Trump administration offering a variety of arguments such as that the intelligence was not verified, that the intelligence was never brought to Trump’s attention, or that Russian and Taliban denials of the affair should be taken as truth; one can quickly surmise that the American public will probably never know the truth. Plausible deniability is on Trump’s side, and however much liberal audiences may cry out, it is unlikely that the official narrative will change. It has become, as all things are in the era of Trump, a “he said, she said” debate with each side claiming wrongdoing by the other. However, this event raises the opportunity to take a look back over Trump’s foreign policy with Russia. 

As many media sources have pointed out, the Trump administration’s seeming foreign policy goals and treatment of Russia has been nothing if not confusing. Marked by anti-Kremlin policies from the administration and GOP allies mixed with a litany of pro-Putin sentiments from Trump, it is an odd tangle of conflicting elements. Looking first at moves by the Trump administration, one finds a fairly homogenous approach of resisting Russian influence. Back in 2017, the Trump administration closed two Russian diplomatic trade annexes and shut down Russia’s consulate in San Francisco over accusations of espionage. However, it was reported that Trump had either been disinterested in said closings or had never been brought in on the decision, with then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis spearheading the move. In the same year, the administration approved the selling of lethal arms to Ukraine to resist Russian-backed forces in Crimea, a move that the Obama administration had refused to do. Moving forward, in 2018, the Trump administration pushed for a $1.4 billion increase in the European Deterrence Initiative budget, an almost 41% increase over the Obama-era.   

However, these foreign policy decisions are juxtaposed by Trump’s personal rhetoric. He has suggested re-instating Russia into the G-7, from which it was removed in 2014 following the annexation of Crimea. He has also floated withdrawing U.S. troops from Germany, which many see as allowing Russian influence in the region to swell and a weakening of NATO power. He was criticized for revealing top-secret Israeli intelligence on ISIS bomb-making to Kremlin officials in a closed-door meeting as well. Trump has posted various pro-Putin remarks over Twitter, and even sent out a congratulations on Putin’s election victory. Trump has also largely denied Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election and seems to give Russia the benefit of the doubt on most issues. A series of bipartisan sanctions imposed on Russia in 2017 by Congress was met by heavy criticism by Trump’s White House and on Twitter. 


Whenever he comes under criticism about his personal treatment of Russia, Trump argues that he has been the toughest president on Russia in recent history and points to the moves by his administration that I mentioned above. However, one has to wonder how many of those moves came from him and how many came from those around him. Is he truly anti-Kremlin and just admires an oil-rich autocrat masquerading as a democratically elected president? Although I do believe that Trump wishes to push American national interest, I seriously doubt that his version of national interest involves an aggressive anti-Russian component. This is not to say that diplomacy should be abandoned or that the U.S. should be antagonistic, but that refusing to admit to Putin’s authoritarian tendencies and the Kremlin’s desire to manipulate the American electorate in order to erode our power abroad is ultimately far worse than turning a blind eye. 

As much as Trump may say it doesn’t, his rhetoric matters. Posting on Twitter is his main avenue for communicating with the wider world and acting congenial and supportive of the Russian regime should not be dismissed as casual talk without meaning. You can bet that the Kremlin is watching, learning, anticipating, and acting upon the things that Trump posts. They obviously see him as an ally in a world order that views Russia with suspicion. The fact that his administration has been tough on them has not appeared to overly sour Putin’s chummy relationship with Trump nor dissuade Russian trolls and interference. 

In closing, although the Trump administration as a whole has made admirable moves towards resisting Russian influence and pushing for the expansion of American national interest, Trump’s own feelings and narrative of Russia is highly divergent and does not fill me with confidence. Hypothetically, if Trump was told that Russian operatives were paying the Taliban to kill U.S. servicemen, from a reading of his tweets, I am not confident that Trump would take this as intelligence to act upon. And in a world where our president has openly expressed admiration for a world leader that utilizes the organs of state for personal enrichment, that should worry all of us. 

The United States-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement (USMCA) Examined

The United States-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement (USMCA) Examined

July 8, 2020


Touted by supporters as the new NAFTA 2.0, one of the major tenets underlying the Trump Administration’s foreign policy platform was recently put into practice.  On July 1, the USMCA (United States – Mexico – Canada Agreement) officially replaced NAFTA as the economic blueprint to regional trade.  For the past 3 years, the Trump Administration has been revising and modifying specifications of the free trade policy that has governed the rules of North American cross-border commerce.

The administration has repeatedly attacked previously negotiated free trade agreements, characterizing them as one-sided trade deals that weakened America’s competitiveness in the global market.  NAFTA was no exception to presidential criticism. In the past, the president has threatened to punish American manufacturers who sought to utilize supply chains south of the border, by subjecting them to tariffs on domestic re-entry, even when U.S. businesses have been able to lower costs, raise profits, and increase market capitalization.

Briefly, some of the elements of USMCA incorporated as part of the revision were higher degrees of protection for the automotive industry through more stringent rules of origin.  Auto manufacturers must ensure that 75% of the components used in the production of passenger vehicles come from North America, up from 62.5% under the original NAFTA terms.  If producers fail to comply, automobiles in production will be subject to duties and tariffs each time automotive content is exchanged from country to country.  The lifecycle of the automotive manufacturing process requires extensive cross-border mechanical flow of parts and commercial testing, exposing producers in the region to inflated costs.  Besides meeting a quota on automotive contents, the USMCA requires that 70% of the steel and aluminum used in production must originate from either Mexico, Canada, or the U.S.  Moreover, labor initiatives ensure that nearly 45% of content must be produced by regional workers, earning a minimum of $16 per hour.  Although other general labor, environmental, and intellectual property provisions were administered through USMCA, the basis of the Trump trade policy has been built on a foundation dominated by the tenets of mercantilism, targeting a host of actors ranging from domestic industries to global trading partners.


President Trump has repeatedly used false narratives and misguided nationalism as the “smoke and mirrors” to justify his protectionist agenda. Nothing has been politicized more and understood less than the benefits of foreign trade.  The Trump administration has cultivated the notion that trade policy has been negotiated from a position of weakness, to which Americans have long shouldered the cost, citing the overall trade deficit as proof of his claims.

The problem with this assertion is that it’s rooted in a fundamental misunderstanding of the way the global economy operates.  While it is certainly true that the U.S. runs a persistent trade deficit with most of its trading partners, the balance of trade is an inconsequential metric in determining success in the global market.  The gains to trade are not governed by the ability to run a positive balance of trade, but rather by the capacity to increase overall standards of living.  In fact, the trade deficit is only a portion of the total effect of international commerce and is reciprocated and financed by a capital surplus.  Dollars spent abroad on imports always come to return as capital investment, maintaining the constant flow of jobs and economic growth.  However, because the Trump administration has politicized the trade deficit as a means of imposing protectionist policies, the president has used this as justification to shield some of the biggest companies on the planet from foreign competition, all at the expense of taxpayers.  Truth is, the trade deficit is no more a symptom of economic failure than the trade surplus is of economic success.

On the contrary, the way to make American businesses more competitive is not through protecting them from foreign competition, but rather encouraging them to use the most efficient factors of production, whether its supply chains in Mexico or factories abroad.  More than half of the products imported from countries like Mexico and Canada are raw materials used by manufacturers in the downstream value-added sectors of the economy.  Allowing producers to operate in an open market ensures they will be able to lower cost, boost economic growth, and create economies of scale.  When small businesses can be the benefactors of an open market, rather than one restrained by tariffs, quotas, and subsidization, they are able to maximize profit and re-invest back in the U.S. economy, thus creating long-term sustainable employment.

A successful trade relationship should seek to promote mutual interests, where the benefits of one nation don’t undermine that of another.  The global landscape has transitioned since the times of the Cold War.  No longer does the international community reward power and conflict but rather peace and cooperation.  Countries who have integrated economic interests have a greater propensity to cooperate in achieving prosperity.

With that said, approximately a year ago, the Trump Administration publicly declared political victory after the U.S. forced Mexico to capitulate to initiatives set forth by the president in an attempt to get the Mexican government to reduce the effects of illegal immigration.  This so-called agreement was bound by the threat of billions of dollars of tariffs the U.S. promised to impose on Latin American imports in the absence of Mexico’s cooperation. The problem with this arrangement is that if Mexico fails to meet its objectives, the president will ultimately unleash the punitive effects of this mutual destructive scheme that would not only harm regional economic growth but would also exacerbate the effects of illegal immigration.

Rather than seeking a policy that would induce such austere effects for both Latin America and the U.S., the president should seek to promote incentives necessary to make both nations better off.  Policies that foster multilateral success would discourage citizens from leaving home in search of economic prosperity.  Granting U.S. market access would enable trading partners to boost earnings.  When America’s trading partners prosper and earn more, they can, in turn, buy more from American producers, which would ensure the U.S. remains competitive in the global market. The success of American exporters will always be contingent on whether foreigners have the financial necessities to acquire U.S. products.  Therefore, when the president seeks to punish our trading partners, he ultimately punishes Americans as well.

Ultimately, as long as the Trump Administration continues to deviate from the traditions that have promoted international security and global prosperity, neither the U.S, Mexico, nor Canada will be the benefactors of the potential windfall that the productive forces of unrestricted free trade can potentially unleash for North America.

Resistance Resources:

  • Center for Strategic & International Studies – [https://www.csis.org/topics/economics/trade-and-international-business] – is a non-partisan U.S. think tank that provides analysis of the climate, global trends, and risks in the global commercial environment.  They consult on policy issues ranging from   international trade, governance, competitiveness, and international economic development.
  • Cato Institute – [https://www.cato.org/research/trade-policy] – is a public policy research organization dedicated to the principles of freedom, free-markets, and peace.  Through publishing policy proposals, blogs, web features, op‐​eds and TV appearances, Cato has worked vigorously to present citizens with incisive and understandable analysis.
  • Mercatus Center – [https://www.mercatus.org/tags/trade-and-immigration] – is a university-based research center bridging the gap between academic ideas and real-world problems. Their mission is to generate knowledge and understanding of the institutions that affect the freedom to prosper and live peaceful lives.
Capitalism Butts Up Against US Core Values in the Global Economy

Capitalism Butts Up Against US Core Values in the Global Economy

Policy Summary:

             Earlier this month, the surging video communications company Zoom joined the growing ranks of enterprises that have made concessions to or followed Chinese directives on content, censorship, and other aspects of company policy. On the 31st anniversary of the Tiananmen Square Massacre, several activist groups that had organized meetings over Zoom had their accounts suspended and later reinstated following public backlash in the West, with Zoom attempting to strike some semblance of compromise by promising to develop applications for the control of accounts based upon geographical location. As many companies have already discovered, the tantalizing consumer base in China comes packaged with strings, and these strings are often at odds with Western conceptions of free speech in the capitalist market.

The past and current year have been full of such clashes between the demands of the CCP party line and the expectations of Western consumers for their beloved corporate powers to champion the all-American values of democracy and free speech. The General Manager of the Houston Rockets made a now notorious tweet expressing support for the pro-democracy Hong Kong protests, which was met by a statement of condemnation from China and an apologist statement by the NBA that would later be walked-back following public outcry. In a similar episode, Activision Blizzard banned an e-sports player from official events for a year in response to said player voicing support for Hong Kong autonomy during a live-streamed interview, along with firing the two casters conducting the interview. Once again, Blizzard walked back the severity of the punishment following Western public backlash, reducing the bans on both the casters and the player to six months.

Looking at the NBA, Blizzard, and Zoom as case studies in this emerging phenomenon, one notices immediate parallels. All of these companies have significant and growing consumer bases in China. 10% of total NBA profits are currently generated in China, with this being projected to only increase to 30% in the years to come. In 2019, Blizzard made almost $100 million in revenue in China. Zoom has regularly listed China as one of its top markets and around 30% of its workforce is based in the country. All three of these companies, and all companies within the international market for that matter, have a lot to lose if they resist the demands of the CCP.


If I may be blunt and let a bit of my more radical, liberal-arts background peek through, what Western audiences are confronting with such consternation is the purpose, and by extension the inevitable limits, of the capitalist market that they so strongly cling to. The purpose of an enterprise within capitalism is the generation of profit. It is not to respect free speech, freedom of assembly, or what have you. If these concepts and their support increases one’s revenue, praise be! A corporation, a company, a capitalist entity within the market is meant to make money. Everything else is secondary. Therefore, if (in a wholly hypothetical situation of course) an authoritative regime demands certain concessions in order to allow a company access to a demanding consumer population, it is by all the best logic of capitalism that a company does so.

However, this linear thinking of capitalism does not account for the issue of world systems. The U.S. is and continues to be the greatest consumer market in the world. China, despite its formidable capacity, will not surpass it for at least a few decades by most accounts. Companies within the world market must therefore contend with the competing giants of the dominant American-led, Western market demands and the growing CCP-controlled market demands. In the West, enterprises are expected to uphold and respect the tenets of democracy, free speech, etc. In China, the CCP expects enterprises to censor certain topics, encourage public stability, and maintain a relatively positive image of the party. These two systems do not play nice with each other for obvious reasons. I feel almost sorry for Zoom and the others. How is one to make money off both?

American and Western audiences expect their businesses to preach and support democratic values. Capitalism and the American identity have become so intertwined by our nation’s very founding by the Virginia Company, the fight against communism, and much more that we forget that capitalism does not care about our identity. Sure, the people within a company might, but capitalism cares about growth and profit. Politics, ethics, and what have you only becomes of interest when it impinges upon them. And at the moment, it does not appear that CCP demands have in any way stifled their economy. State-led capitalism has in fact seemed to have ushered in an extremely long-winded period of unrivaled growth and expansion within China.

I see three options for companies in the current world market. One, they can continue on their current course of stumbling between the CCP and the West, giving out and redacting apologies and condemnations depending on which system pushes harder. Two, they can choose to operate solely within the Western or Chinese market system. This eliminates any possible tension because due to the following of only one ruleset but brings with it the cost of losing out on a formidable consumer base. Or three, they can go the road of Zoom. This would most probably look like the provision of tools for CCP censorship use and control, the isolation of U.S. consumer information from Chinese sources, and the donning of a public image of walking an incredibly fine line.

I also see two options for Western, and particularly America, consumers. One, we can accept that companies will pursue profit and that this is simply the natural outcome of our market system. This would involve the surrendering of the notion that businesses based or founded in the U.S. should pursue our values in all areas of operation. Or two, we can demand that companies operating or founded in the U.S. enforce and support the propagation of American ideals. This would most probably involve boycotting companies that fail to do so, public action, policy from the government, and substantial growing pains as the companies in question choose sides. However, I would argue that both options must include some degree of disassociation of capitalism from the American identity. We must realize that although capitalism may have been integral in the formation of the U.S., it is not ours to claim sole ownership of. It has only been stained with our values within our system. Its core has not changed to fit free speech or other notions within it. One may only look to corporate lawsuits against negative journalism and whistleblowers as proof. The sooner we recognize this crucial fact, the sooner we will come to understand the plight of companies caught between Washington and Beijing.

US Withdrawal from World Health Organization Stuns Experts and Even Some Republicans

US Withdrawal from World Health Organization Stuns Experts and Even Some Republicans

In May, President Trump announced that he is withdrawing the U.S. from the World Health Organization (WHO). Announcement of the withdrawal comes after Trump time and again reviled the WHO’s handling of the novel Coronavirus response. Many experts have stated that the unprecedented move jeopardizes the efficiency of global health responses and can even obstruct the process of developing a vaccine for COVID-19.

Trump claims that the WHO had failed to act appropriately during the nascent days of the pandemic. Namely, for not sounding the alarm in time about the spread of the Coronavirus out of Wuhan.

In April, the Trump Administration froze U.S. funding to the WHO. Trump then sent a letter to the WHO director demanding “substantive changes” to the organization’s procedures within the next thirty days or else the U.S. will permanently cut funding to the agency. Just eleven days later, Trump made the decision final.

This decision has seen bipartisan backlash. “I disagree with the president’s decision,” said Sen. Lamar Alexander, R-Tenn., chairman of the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee, in a statement after the announcement. “Withdrawing U.S. membership could, among other things, interfere with clinical trials that are essential to the development of vaccines, which citizens of the United States as well as others in the world need. And withdrawing could make it harder to work with other countries to stop viruses before they get to the United States.”

The legality of Trump’s withdrawal is still not clear. However, if the decision does follow through, congress can challenge it.

“This decision is really so short-sighted and ill-advised, and all it does is put American lives at risk,” said Dr. Howard Koh, former assistant secretary for health in the Obama administration and now a professor at Harvard’s T. H. Chan School of Public Health.

Since the WHO’s founding in 1948, the U.S. has always played an outsized role in the agency’s operations. American experts hold many high ranking positions including in emergency committees which are in place to deliberate pandemic responses. It also remains unclear what would happen to their positions in the agency after a U.S. withdrawal.


A global centralized response to pandemics—especially one like the COVID-19 pandemic—is the most effective way to combat their spread.

Many have interpreted the move to withdraw from the WHO as an attempt to divert attention from the Trump Administration’s botched Coronavirus response.

The U.S. leads the world in most COVID-19 deaths and many experts claim that the numbers wouldn’t be as high as they are today had the President taken the virus more seriously during its early days.

Earlier this year, Trump downplayed the severity of the virus and even praised Chinese president Xi Jinping for his handling of its spread—although the very reason Trump is blaming the WHO is for not being tough on China.

Perhaps rescinding membership of the WHO is just another part of efforts to tarnish globalization, which is part of the agenda of the right-wing’s anti-globalization, nationalist stance.

Whatever the case may be, precluding U.S. support to the WHO in the middle of a global pandemic will likely disrupt the vaccine development process, stifle an organized attempt at stopping the spread of the virus, and inflict other ramifications related to world health.

Learn more:

The World Health Organization is the world’s number one organization in helping stop the spread of diseases in less developed countries as well as all over the world. It has been at the forefront in attempting to mobilize the world against COVID-19.

Global Health Council is a coalition of organizations serving as a hub for business engagement on the world’s most pressing global health issues.

Why Have Some Countries Been Better Able to  Contain Covid-19 Than Others

Why Have Some Countries Been Better Able to Contain Covid-19 Than Others

By Hassan Elsebai

June 8, 2020


The Coronavirus death toll now exceeds one hundred thousand in the United States and is far ahead of every other country with respect to both deaths and confirmed cases. Followed by the UK with almost 40,000 deaths(June 1st). Italy and Brazil take third and fourth place, respectively. To understand how we got to this point it is imperative to examine the early actions taken by these countries’ leadership.

the U.S., the U.K., and Brazil—all three of which are currently run by a conservative government or administration— have been criticized for failing to act in both a responsible and timely manner.

President Trump insists the U.S, is “leading the way” in combatting the pandemic, and a role model for other countries to emulate. But the U.S. had fumbled an opportunity to act fast after grave reports of the COVID-19 death toll emerged out of Wuhan and Italy before the virus spread to the rest of the world. Trump in late February called the Coronavirus a Democrat “hoax.”

The federal government was slow to react and introduce central policy in the early stages of the pandemic. Individual states were given the responsibility of shutting down. Testing and contact tracing—the most robust methods of containing the spread of the virus— were absent from the federal policy. Trump promoted the use of a certain medication even when many medical experts said there was no proof of its effectiveness.

The early U.K. response was ambivalent. The leadership on Downing Street was still wrapping their heads around Brexit and clearly had no organized plan for the pandemic. Boris Johnson’s early statements assured there would be no ‘Wuhan style’ lockdowns. Talks arose of an unconventional ‘herd immunity’ approach by the U.K. in a unique attempt to flatten the curve. Top U.K. officials and cabinet members continued to underplay the severity of the Coronavirus.

On March 18, Johnson announced the closure of all schools. All restaurants and bars were ordered to close on March 20th, long after other nations imposed their own shutdowns. A former cabinet minister called it a “screeching u-turn.” Prime Minister Johnson finally took advice from the scientific community but only after putting his country in a dangerously precarious position and before he himself would contract the Coronavirus.

The Greek newspaper Ethnos described Johnson as “more dangerous than coronavirus”, saying one of the crisis’s greatest tragedies was that “incompetent leaders” such as Johnson and Donald Trump were “at the helm at a time of such emergency”.

Brazil has seen a steep increase in cases and is expected to be —if not already— the world’s most infected country. Brazil’s President Jair Bolsonaro like Trump and Johnson, is characterized by the adjectives: populist and conservative. Another thing they all have in common is their skepticism of science and early action. Bolsonaro has been reluctant to implement shutdowns or any social distancing guidelines while the countries healthcare system struggles to fight the virus and administer testing.

Sweeping poverty and extreme inequality further debilitate Brazil’s healthcare system and catalyze the spread of the virus, in a country rampant with favelas where social distancing is virtually impossible.

Andy Slavitt, Obama’s former health official, drew comparisons between the U.S. and Brazil’s handling of the pandemic “Brazil is [a lesson] in what the U.S. would look like if Trump had been allowed to continue to ignore the outbreak as he was through mid-March”


The Trump administration, and the far-right, have long put business profits over common sense and public health. Skepticism of the scientific community manifests itself in Trump’s policies through deregulation. The New York Times writes “The president’s COVID-19 response has extended the administration’s longstanding practice of undermining scientific expertise for political purposes.” Environmental concerns are thrown out the window and the EPA is continuously gutted.

Many countries have exemplified proper remedies to combat the spread of the virus. Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore, Germany, and New Zealand had brought in controls on travelers from infected regions and strict contact tracing to help understand who could have been exposed, inform them, and require self-isolation. Face masks became widespread in east Asia, long before it was recommended elsewhere.

Germany’s Angela Merkel has been praised for her effective leadership since the start of the pandemic. Germany has been hailed for its model response for introducing early testing and consistent planning. The German Health Ministry has said that it was testing 80,000 people per week in early March, and about 400,000 tests per week in April. Early testing coupled with Germany’s robust public health infrastructure made the country better equipped to handle a crisis.

New Zealand has reportedly ‘eliminated’ COVID-19 from the country and has begun returning to ‘normal.’ The nation accomplished this by installing an early and aggressive lockdown followed by effectively managing its borders, contact tracing, testing, and surveillance.

Now, compare these leaders and stories with the populist strongmen using the crisis to spread messages of authoritarianism, blame others, and demonize journalists.

Many experts have stated that the U.S.’s severe death toll was avoidable. Had the United States followed a timely, scientific, and central approach, the COVID-19 death toll would not be as high as it is today.

Resistance Resources:

  • Environmental Integrity: A government watchdog that reports and combats any environmental deregulation on the part of government officials.
  • Health Policy Watch: Reports on global health policy. Transparent reporting highlights important government responses to infectious disease outbreaks and other health concerns.
Pompeo’s Weird Iran Scheme

Pompeo’s Weird Iran Scheme

With the coronavirus pandemic rightly taking center-stage over the past few months, the limelight has been shifted from traditionally discussed topics of foreign policy.

Policy Summary
With the coronavirus pandemic rightly taking center-stage over the past few months, the limelight has been shifted from traditionally discussed topics of foreign policy. However, this does not mean that the Department of State has shuttered its doors and ceased working. In fact, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo came forward in late April with a rather convoluted plan to re-impose UN sanctions on Iran by way of a thorny legal argument that worked around President Trump’s declaration of withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and the unilateral application of sanctions by the U.S. The strategy was conjured up by the Trump administration following the realization that the UN conventional arms embargo on Iran was going to expire in October, with Russia desiring to return to business-as-usual arms sales with the Iranian regime. The Trump administration has argued that if the arms embargo is not extended past its expiration date in the fall, that Iran will begin re-supplying weaponry to various national security threats and terrorist groups.

Let’s begin by first looking at what the Iran nuclear deal is meant to do and what state it is currently in. First, the accord is formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or the JCPOA. The Obama-era agreement was struck between Iran, the U.S., EU, China, France, Russia, UK, and Germany; with the U.S. being the arguable lynchpin. The JCPOA forced Iran to send 97% of its generated nuclear fuel to Russia (as of 2016), along with limiting its production of nuclear material for the duration of 15 years and opening Iran’s nuclear facilities to inspection by the UN. In terms of the JCPOA’s current state, to all of the available evidence, Iran followed the agreement for a year following Trump’s declaration of the U.S.’s withdrawal from the accord but has been gradually violating set restrictions over the past year despite rebukes and threats by abiding European signatories. The Iranian regime has declared that it will go back to abiding by JCPOA limitations if Trump agrees to lift U.S. sanctions and re-enters the deal on the previous terms. Despite these sanctions, Iran has refused to negotiate with the Trump administration, which wishes to negotiate a far more stringent nuclear agreement.

We can now turn to Pompeo’s new strategy to drag Iran kicking and screaming to the negotiation table. The tactic relies upon the UN upholding Pompeo’s claim that despite Trump unilaterally imposing sanctions and declaring U.S. withdrawal from the deal, that the U.S. is still a so-called “participant state” to the deal due to it being an original signatory. If this premise is accepted, the U.S. would hypothetically be able to pressure the restoration of pre-2015 UN sanctions on oil sales and banking activities if the arms embargo is not prolonged. The Trump administration would then be able to lord its ability to re-impose far more stringent sanctions over Russia, ensuring that the U.S.-backed arms embargo would be extended.

It was reported by the New York Times that Pompeo is anticipating that upon the U.S. demanding that the Security Council prolong the arms embargo, Russia will immediately veto it. The U.S. would then assert that it is still a participant in the deal, as it is an original signatory and argue that Trump’s declaration of withdrawal did not revoke the U.S.’s rights as such. The Times did not provide the text of this legal argument, but I am curious as to how Pompeo can make such an assertion. Setting this aside however, if the claim is accepted by the UN, the U.S. would then point to Iran’s violation of the treaty’s limitations and demand a return to pre-2015 UN sanctions, as put forth in the JCPOA.


This is, at best and in my untrained legal opinion, a tenuous gray area to say the least. Although the U.S. is certainly an original signatory to the JCPOA under Obama, Trump has most definitely withdrawn from the deal and has been imposing US sanctions for the past two years. I may not be a lawyer nor am I well-versed in contracts, but it was my understanding that upon a party choosing to leave an agreement, it can no longer make demands as though it is a participant in said agreement. How does Trump leaving the JCPOA mean the U.S. has retained its powers as a signatory? I am not arguing that the arms embargo should not be extended or that its extension is not in the best interest of U.S. national security, but that the Trump administration is flagrantly attempting to have its cake and eat it too. A small criticism perhaps in the enormous fabric of the fight over the Iran deal, but certainly a bizarre one of note.

In addition, Pompeo’s plan was announced after the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps launched a military satellite, which he asserted to be proof of Iran’s space program not being peaceful in nature. What this has to do with the UN arms embargoes and the nuclear deal I have no idea. Perhaps it was meant as evidence of Iranian aggression that would support the use of Pompeo’s legalese tactic? Who knows? Either way it’s an odd spark for an equally odd case.


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