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The ‘Radical Left’: Defining Dissent in Divided America (Elections & Politics Brief #196)
Following Charlie Kirk’s assassination, President Trump is pushing to go after ‘radical left’ groups, those he claims promote political violence and engage in hate speech. What happened to Charlie Kirk is despicable & the politically motivated murder of an American has been condemned by leaders across the political spectrum. That said, the way we do that is by coming together as Americans not targeting our fellow citizens.
How To Ensure A Fair And Safe 2026 Midterm Election (Election and Politics #197)
With only nine months of his presidency in the books, President Donald Trump has undertaken a radical reshaping of American democracy. From its courts to its liberties, Trump is actively pushing for an American society that serves him and his movement.
Trump’s Efforts in Making Peace Between Russia and Ukraine (Foreign Policy Brief #217)
On August 15, after his meeting with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump said it had been “a great and very successful day in Alaska.” In phone calls with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, European leaders, and NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte, Trump added that his talks with Putin had gone “very well.” He later wrote: “It was determined by all that the best way to end the horrific war between Russia and Ukraine is to go directly to a peace agreement, which would end the war, and not a mere ceasefire agreement, which oftentimes does not hold up.”
Trump and Intel — A Republican-Backed Nationalization (Elections & Politics Brief #194)
In a surprise move, on August 22nd Donald Trump’s administration and the global technology company Intel announced a deal. In it, the United States government will make an $8.9 billion purchase of Intel stock, giving it around a 10% stake in the company.
Is It Time to Take a Look at Our Own Gun Laws? (Social Justice Policy Brief #178)
Gunfire remains a defining crisis in the United States. On an average day, roughly 125 people are killed with guns and many more are wounded, a toll that reverberates through classrooms, workplaces, and families. Recent data compilations show that by late August 2025 the country had already endured more than 300 mass shootings this year, with hundreds killed and well over a thousand injured. These are not abstractions; they are neighbors, classmates, and coworkers.
AI Dirties the Air and Drives Demands for Environmental Justice (Technology Policy Brief #155)
Artificial Intelligence is more ubiquitous in our daily lives than you may realize. It drives the constant stream of personalized ads, instant navigation directions when driving, voice assistants such as Siri and Alexa, shows up first in our Google searches, and much more. The massive data centers powering all that instant intelligence are less visible to those of us who use it the most. But they have become ubiquitous in lower-income communities of color, communities with the least access to high-speed home internet and some of the worst air pollution in the country.
The Week That Was Around The Globe (Foreign Policy Brief #216)
Relatives of people killed by Israeli fire while they were waiting to receive humanitarian aid mourn outside al-Shifa hospital in Gaza City. Photograph: Anadolu/Getty Images
Where Gerrymandering Comes From—and Where It’s Going (Elections & Politics Brief #193)
Gerrymandering began as a nineteenth-century power play in Massachusetts, when Governor Elbridge Gerry signed a state senate redistricting bill whose oddly shaped Essex County district reminded a newspaper illustrator of a salamander. The nickname stuck, and so did the tactic: drawing electoral district lines to advantage a party or faction and to weaken cohesive communities of interest.
USRESIST SHARE: August 2025 #1
We are pleased to send you the current issue of USRESIST SHARE—our bi-weekly magazine of the latest news Briefs by our Reporters. USRESIST SHARE is intended to deepen your understanding of today’s leading public policy and political issues. We hope you’ll enjoy and welcome your feedback.
Is It Time to Take a Look at Our Own Gun Laws? (Social Justice Policy Brief #178)
Social Justice Policy Brief #178 | Inijah Quadri | September 12, 2025
Policy Issue Summary
Gunfire remains a defining crisis in the United States. On an average day, roughly 125 people are killed with guns and many more are wounded, a toll that reverberates through classrooms, workplaces, and families. Recent data compilations show that by late August 2025 the country had already endured more than 300 mass shootings this year, with hundreds killed and well over a thousand injured. These are not abstractions; they are neighbors, classmates, and coworkers.
Best available estimates put the U.S. civilian gun stock in the hundreds of millions: the Small Arms Survey estimated ~393 million civilian-held firearms in 2018, and industry analyses of ATF manufacturing/import data suggest the total may be around 500 million as at 2025. Ownership is unevenly distributed: about 32% of U.S. adults personally own a gun and another 10% live in gun-owning households; ownership is far more common in rural (47%) than suburban (30%) or urban (20%) areas. Recent U.S. production skews toward handguns and rifles; ATF reports ~9.8 million firearms manufactured in 2023 (about 4.0M pistols and 3.1M rifles).
The headlines of 2024–2025 underscore the point. A celebratory Super Bowl parade in Kansas City became a crime scene, with one person killed and 22 wounded, many of them children. A 16-year-old opened fire at a Colorado high school, gravely injuring two classmates. Last week, the assassination of conservative activist Charlie Kirk at a Utah university jolted the country yet again, and it follows the 2024 attempted assassination of Donald Trump at a Pennsylvania rally. Whether violence is politically motivated or not, the through-line is access to firearms that can end lives in seconds.
Why does the U.S. have so many guns? Several structural factors matter: (1) permissive carry policy—29 states now allow permitless concealed carry; (2) sustained political influence—gun-rights groups spent about $14.7 million on federal lobbying in 2024, led by the industry trade group NSSF; and (3) cultural patterns—protection is the top reason owners cite for having a gun.
Beyond policy, there are deeper reasons the civilian stock is so large. A long-standing constitutional tradition of an individual right to bear arms has normalized private ownership across generations; a strong rural hunting and sport-shooting culture introduces firearms early in life; and many owners cite personal protection as their primary motivation. At the same time, uneven rules and enforcement—such as the absence of universal background checks nationwide and the spread of permitless carry across dozens of states—lower barriers to acquisition. Additionally, in a highly polarized environment, inflammatory political rhetoric that frames fellow Americans as threats reinforces demand for guns kept for self-defense.
Gun violence is also not primarily a “mental-health problem.” Most U.S. firearm deaths are suicides (58% in 2023), and among interpersonal violence, serious mental illness accounts for only a small share of overall violent acts (often estimated around 3–5%). Risk is driven more by access to guns, prior violent behavior (including domestic abuse), substance misuse, and situational conflicts. Mental-health care is vital—especially for suicide prevention—but blaming mental illness for most shootings misdiagnoses the drivers of gun harm.
Law and policy are not static. The Supreme Court last year upheld the federal law disarming those under domestic-violence restraining orders (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) bars possession of firearms or ammunition by a person subject to a qualifying domestic-violence restraining order entered after notice and a hearing; the order must either find a “credible threat” to an intimate partner/child or expressly prohibit the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. The Court upheld § 922(g)(8) in United States v. Rahimi on June 21, 2024, and in March 2025 it upheld the Biden-era rule that closes the “ghost gun” loophole by requiring serial numbers and background checks for build-at-home kits.
At the state level, Maine enacted its strongest gun-safety package after the Lewiston massacre, including a three-day waiting period and expanded background checks. Yet the new federal administration has simultaneously walked back public-health framing of gun violenceand disbanded/cut spending meant for national coordination offices, leaving a patchwork response ill-suited to a national emergency. “Public-health framing” means treating firearm injury like other preventable injuries—using surveillance data, risk-factor analysis, and evidence-based prevention (e.g., safe-storage, ERPOs, community violence intervention), as reflected in the U.S. Surgeon General’s June 2024 advisory declaring firearm violence a public health crisis; HHS removed that advisory from its site in March 2025.
Analysis
From a progressive perspective, the status quo is intolerable because it normalizes preventable death. The United States couples the world’s most permissive civilian gun market with weak gatekeeping: no universal background checks, broad public carry, minimal training, and ready access to high-capacity, rapid-fire weaponry. Predictably, the result is more shootings of every kind—mass violence, domestic assaults, community shootings, suicides—than our peer nations experience.
Evidence points toward an ambitious, comprehensive strategy. Firearm purchaser licensing—permits that require fingerprinting, in-person applications, and safety training—has been associated with fewer gun homicides and dramatically fewer fatal mass shootings. When states adopt licensing, violence falls; when they repeal it, violence rises. These are not speculative models but population-level findings echoed across multiple studies, including one conducted by Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. For example, a 2025 peer-reviewed Injury Prevention study found that adopting purchaser-licensing laws was associated with decreases in firearm homicide and suicide among 15–24-year-olds, while repeals were followed by increases; earlier multi-state analyses also linked licensing to lower firearm deaths.
Regulating the hardware matters too. In March 2025, the Supreme Court upheld the Biden-era rule that brings “ghost guns”—build-it-yourself, untraceable kits—under the Gun Control Act, requiring serial numbers and background checks for kits and key parts. (In Bondi v. VanDerStok (Mar. 26, 2025), the Court held 7–2 that ATF may regulate at least some weapon-parts kits and unfinished frames/receivers under the Gun Control Act of 1968.)
The Gun Control Act (1968) is the federal baseline: it defines “firearm” for serialization and records, requires federal licensing of dealers, restricts interstate sales, and disqualifies “prohibited persons.” Other key federal statutes include the National Firearms Act (1934) (tax/registration for machine guns, short-barreled rifles/shotguns, and suppressors), the Brady Act (1993) creating the FBI’s NICS background-check system, the Lautenberg Amendment (1996) barring those convicted of misdemeanor domestic-violence offenses, and the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act (2022) (enhanced checks for under-21 buyers, new straw-purchasing/trafficking crimes, and funding for violence-intervention). The ruling affirmed ATF’s authority to regulate at least some weapon-parts kits, while leaving room for case-by-case challenges.
Courts have also begun to uphold state-level bans on assault weapons and large-capacity magazines under the Supreme Court’s 2022 Bruen test. In April 2025, the First Circuit upheld Massachusetts’s long-standing assault weapons ban at the preliminary-injunction stage, a major win for the state’s post-Bruen framework. In June 2025, the Supreme Court declined to review other challenges, leaving in place rulings upholding Maryland’s assault-weapons ban and Rhode Island’s 10-round magazine limit. Research points in the same direction.
Peer-reviewed studies associate large-capacity-magazine limits with fewer high-fatality mass shootings and lower death tolls, and evidence reviews conclude that restricting assault-style rifles and magazine size likely reduces casualties when shootings occur. Taken together, the law and the data support acting now—not waiting for perfect certainty while lives are lost. Illustratively, a Public Health study found that states without bans on large-capacity magazines experienced more mass shootings with high numbers of deaths; those shootings tended to be deadlier. Broader reviews, like one from RAND, say the evidence on assault weapon bans is weak or unclear, but there’s some support that limiting magazine size can reduce the number of casualties.
Public opinion, even amid polarization, provides permission to move. Majorities still favor stricter gun laws overall and support an assault-weapons ban, with overwhelming support among Democrats for banning assault-style rifles and high-capacity magazines. Americans have already accepted robust safety regimes for driving, aviation, and consumer products; they are not allergic to rules that demonstrably save lives.
Policy should therefore meet the scale of the crisis. A proper blueprint starts with national purchaser licensing and universal background checks, mandatory safe-storage standards with liability for negligence, a ban on assault-style weapons and magazines over ten rounds, waiting periods, age 21 minimums for all gun purchases, and a federal buyback that shrinks the stock of the most lethal firearms. It also includes repealing special liability shields for the gun industry, closing trafficking pipelines with recordkeeping and inspections, and sustained investment in community-based violence-intervention programs that reduce shootings without increasing incarceration. Each component is feasible within existing constitutional contours, particularly after Rahimi and the ghost-guns ruling affirmed that lawmakers can disarm dangerous individuals and regulate modern firearm technologies.
States need not wait for Congress. Maine’s post-Lewiston reforms show that waiting periods and background-check expansion are politically achievable even in gun-owning states. The data infrastructure to track progress exists today in the Gun Violence Archive (a nonpartisan database that compiles incidents from about 7,500 law-enforcement, media, and government sources; counts are incident-level and near-real-time, and GVA defines a “mass shooting” as four or more people shot, injured or killed, excluding the shooter) and in public-health centers, and it should be federally funded, standardized, and linked to real-time enforcement. Momentum grows when policies deliver visible safety gains—fewer stolen guns, fewer domestic-violence shootings, fewer kids shot at school or at parades. This is the horizon we should demand, not another year of elegies.
Engagement Resources
Gun Violence Archive (Gun Violence Archive): Incident-level, real-time data and clear methodology used by journalists and researchers; indispensable for tracking trends and accountability.
Everytown Research & Policy (Everytown Research & Policy): Extensive research syntheses, policy explainers, and state-by-state solutions, including detailed briefs on assault-weapons and background-check reforms.
Giffords Law Center (GIFFORDS): Legal analysis, litigation updates, and a comprehensive database of state gun laws to support advocacy and drafting.
Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Violence Solutions (Bloomberg School of Public Health): Gold-standard public-health research on purchaser licensing, safe storage, ERPOs, and more, with accessible summaries for advocates.
The Trace (The Trace): Nonprofit newsroom dedicated to gun-violence reporting, data projects, and investigations that illuminate policy choices and industry influence.
AI Dirties the Air and Drives Demands for Environmental Justice (Technology Policy Brief #155)
Technology Policy Brief #155 | Mindy Spatt | September 4, 2025
Summary
Artificial Intelligence is more ubiquitous in our daily lives than you may realize. It drives the constant stream of personalized ads, instant navigation directions when driving, voice assistants such as Siri and Alexa, shows up first in our Google searches, and much more. The massive data centers powering all that instant intelligence are less visible to those of us who use it the most. But they have become ubiquitous in lower-income communities of color, communities with the least access to high-speed home internet and some of the worst air pollution in the country.
Analysis
I asked AI itself how great its need for electricity is. It told me data centers use around 1% to 1.5% of the world’s electricity, and that energy needs are doubling rapidly. Data Centers suck up water as well; a mid-sized data center (most are super-sized) uses as much water as 1,000 households in a single day.
What does this mean for the communities the data centers are located in? Diminishing water resources, more air pollution, and higher electric rates. That is because infrastructure costs are paid by all customers, including those who are low-income or energy-insecure, even though they use only a tiny fraction of what a data center uses. What’s worse, utilities may offer large data centers attractive rates that are subsidized by other customers.
State Rep. Justin J. Pearson, a Memphis Democrat, represents a low-income, mostly African American district that is home to 33 gas turbines that fuel a massive data center owned by Elon Musk. It also has many industrial facilities and severely polluted air. In a recent interview, he said “It’s no coincidence that if you are African American in this country, you’re 75% more likely to live near a toxic hazardous waste facility, It’s no accident that in this community, we’re four times more likely to have cancer in our bodies.” Musk’s data center uses enough electricity to power around 100,000 homes.
According to the Climate Justice Alliance the reasons Black communities are getting stuck with the worst impact of AI include:
- Energy production and other polluting industries are already disproportionately located in their communities, and they are already feeling the impacts of climate change.
- As data centers drive up electric rates, more Black households have trouble paying their bills and become energy insecure..
- Jobs often held by lower income people such as food service workers, are in the greatest danger of being replaced by AI.
Furthermore, they point out, while Internet access is essential for access to jobs, education and government programs, 38% of black people in the rural South still don’t have internet at home, so it could be said that the communities the data centers are built in benefit the least from whatever advantages AI has to offer.
Communities Resisting the Tide
Local advocates are demanding solutions. States and municipalities have the power to regulate where data centers are located and to consider the overall environmental impacts rather than approving them in a vacuum. Climate goals should not be abandoned, as Google and other companies are doing. Electric and water rates can be adjusted to account for the enormous burden data centers place on infrastructure.
Activist organization Color of Change has launched a campaign to get Congress members from the South to Hold hearings on the link between AI, data center expansion, and rate hikes, and require racial and environmental impact reviews before any more data centers are approved.
While localities and states can still act, the federal picture is bleak. The Clean Air and Clean Water Act is being abandoned, and the agency supposed to protect people from polluters the Environmental Protection Agency is being gutted and Tech companies have Trump’s ear and he’s got theirs.
Engagement Resources
Are Your Chats With Chat GPT, CoPilot and Gemini Fueling the Climate Crisis? March 28, 2025,
https://climatejusticealliance.org/ai/
Black Tech Agenda: Advancing Equity and Reimagining Technology, https://colorofchange.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/BTA-Report-V6-12-11-24-19-13.pdf
Data Center Boom Risks Health of Already Vulnerable Communities, Cecelia Marrinan, June 12, 2025, https://www.techpolicy.press/data-center-boom-risks-health-of-already-vulnerable-communities/
The Week That Was Around The Globe (Foreign Policy Brief #216)
Foreign Policy Brief #216 | Abran C | September 8, 2025
Genocide in Gaza
Relatives of people killed by Israeli fire while they were waiting to receive humanitarian aid mourn outside al-Shifa hospital in Gaza City. Photograph: Anadolu/Getty Images
Last week the world’s leading genocide scholars, the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS), passed resolution stating that the legal criteria have been met to establish that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza. Genocide was codified in a 1948 convention in response to the immense crimes of the Holocaust and defined as acts “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.” Along with the IAGS, many other major international organizations such as the United Nations, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, along with Israeli rights groups B’Tselem and Physicians for Human Rights-Israel, have released statements and findings that genocide is being committed in Gaza. Israel is also currently facing a separate genocide accusation in its case at the International Court of Justice at The Hague.
The confirmed death toll in Gaza stands at above 60,000 people, though the number is likely much higher. Bombing of civilian infrastructure, the targeting of aid workers and seekers and now starvation continue to claim lives. The IAGS resolution calls on Israel to “immediately cease all acts that constitute genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity against Palestinians in Gaza, including deliberate attacks against and killing of civilians including children; starvation; deprivation of humanitarian aid, water, fuel, and other items essential to the survival of the population; sexual and reproductive violence; and forced displacement of the population.”
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping ahead of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit 2025 at the Meijiang Convention and Exhibition Centre in Tianjin, China, September 1, 2025. SUO TAKEKUMA/Pool via REUTERS
Last week the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit saw the leaders of China, Russia and India meet in Tianjin China, presenting a united front in the face of tensions with the West and particularly with the United States. China and Russia presented their vision of a new international order at the summit and advocated for increased international cooperation. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping held their first meeting on Chinese soil in seven years. The leaders of the world’s two most populous nations, pledged to resolve their differences at the summit, their attempt to renew ties comes just days after Trump imposed a 50% tariff on Indian goods for its purchase of Russian energy exports.
Founded in 2001 and seen as an alternative power structure to most US-led international institutions, the 10 member SCO includes much of Central Asia, Russia, China, India, Iran, Pakistan, and Belarus, with more than a dozen permanent dialogue partner countries, including Saudi Arabia, Cambodia, Qatar, and Turkiye. President Xi also called for the creation of a new SCO development bank, a move that would be a major step towards the bloc’s strongest members’ aspiration of developing an alternative payment system that circumvents the US dollar and the power of US sanctions.
Nationwide anti-government protests in Indonesia
A protester walks with an Indonesian flag in front of the looted police headquarters building in Surabaya, Indonesia, on August 31, 2025 [Juni Kriswanto/AFP]
Indonesia’s largest wave of protests in years comes as economic and political frustration have been brewing and reached a tipping point after a government proposal to a monthly housing allowance of 50 million rupiah or $3,000 for lawmakers. That extra monthly payment to lawmakers is more than 10 times the national average minimum wage. The subsequent protests which started peacefully with students and civil society groups turned violent after an armored police vehicle hit and killed rideshare motorbike driver, Affan Kurniawan, during a clash between police and protesters in Jakarta. His death triggered more protests into the weekend, spreading to other major cities across the country. The Indonesia National Police have arrested thousands of people across the country, including in the capital Jakarta. At a recent press conference at the presidential palace, Indonesian President Prabowo announced that Indonesia’s political parties had reached a consensus to reduce lawmakers’ benefits and the protests have been paused for the time being.
Mexico lifts millions out of poverty
Pedestrians walk on the Zocalo in the Historic Center of Mexico City, Aug. 19, 2023. (AP Photo/Arnulfo Franco, File)
In a recent report by Mexico’s Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI, the national statistics and geography institute) between 2018 and 2024, poverty in Mexico fell from roughly 42% to 29% of the population. More than 13 million people were lifted out of poverty during the six-year term of her predecessor, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, known as “AMLO” and the Morena, left wing party. In 2018, Mexico’s minimum daily wage was 88.36 pesos or $4.70 and among the lowest in Latin America. Now it’s 278.80 pesos per day or $14.9, more than three times higher. Additionally, it is now constitutionally decreed that the minimum wage must rise above the rate of inflation. By 2026 the government is aiming for a further increase in minimum wage to 314.60 pesos per day.
Other programs implemented by Sheinbaum’s government include the universal pensions for all men over 65 years old and women over 60 years old, house-to-house free healthcare for elderly and vulnerable citizens, universal scholarships for all public school students, cash transfers to people with disabilities, cash transfers to working single mothers, transfers to farmers for planting trees, financial credit to medium and small agricultural producers, and more. The policies have proven wildly popular with Sheinbaum approval rating at above 70% in polls after eleven months in office.
Where Gerrymandering Comes From—and Where It’s Going (Elections & Politics Brief #193)
Elections & Politics Brief #193 | By Inijah Quadri | August 24, 2025
Gerrymandering began as a nineteenth-century power play in Massachusetts, when Governor Elbridge Gerry signed a state senate redistricting bill whose oddly shaped Essex County district reminded a newspaper illustrator of a salamander. The nickname stuck, and so did the tactic: drawing electoral district lines to advantage a party or faction and to weaken cohesive communities of interest.
Under federal law, redistricting is tied to the decennial Census. The Census Bureau must deliver Public Law 94-171 (“PL 94-171”) redistricting data to states within a year of Census Day, and states use those data to draw districts. This linkage is set in 13 U.S.C. § 141(c) and the Census Redistricting Data Program.
Modern constitutional law supplies the baseline. In the 1960s, the Supreme Court made redistricting justiciable and required roughly equal populations in all Congressional Districts: Baker v. Carr opened the courthouse door, Wesberry v. Sanders required near-equal congressional districts, and Reynolds v. Sims applied “one person, one vote” to state legislatures.
Later rulings narrowed federal review of partisanship while keeping protections against racial vote dilution alive. In Rucho v. Common Cause (2019), the Court held that partisan-gerrymandering claims are “political questions” beyond federal courts—but left regulation to Congress and the states. At the same time, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act remains enforceable; in Allen v. Milligan (2023) the Court affirmed that maps that dilute Black voters’ power can violate Section 2. Preclearance under Section 5, however, has been inoperative since Shelby County v. Holder (2013) invalidated the coverage formula.
The result is a patchwork in which power struggles play out state by state. Recent flashpoints include Wisconsin’s 2024 shift to less-biased state legislative maps via state-court litigation, Texas’s 2025 mid-decade congressional-map push, and an August 2025 Utah ruling ordering new congressional districts before 2026.
Analysis
Gerrymandering keeps happening because the system rewards it. Winner-take-all, single-member districts let mapmakers create safe seats. Off-the-shelf GIS and mapping tools (e.g., ArcGIS Redistricting, Maptitude for Redistricting), public platforms (Dave’s Redistricting App, DistrictBuilder), and research codes (GerryChain) make precise map-drawing—and auditing—far easier.
But what counts as an “extreme” map? Plans that are statistical outliers compared to large ensembles of neutrally generated maps, or that produce durable seat advantages disconnected from statewide vote share. Independent evaluators like Princeton’s Redistricting Report Card and PlanScore quantify these patterns. Detection alone, though, doesn’t fix them.
What does it mean when courts call partisan gerrymandering a “political question”? It means federal courts say there are no judicially manageable standards to decide such claims; the remedy lies with Congress or state law. The Supreme Court said federal courts won’t decide whether maps are unfairly partisan under the U.S. Constitution (Rucho v. Common Cause(2019)). But states can still ban or limit partisan gerrymandering in their own constitutions and have their state courts enforce those rules—and Congress can pass a national law setting redistricting standards, which federal courts could then enforce.
Race and party often overlap, letting mapmakers hide discrimination behind “partisanship.” Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act bars voting practices that result in minority voters having less opportunity than others to elect candidates of choice. Plaintiffs typically must satisfy the Gingles preconditions (a sufficiently large and compact minority community, political cohesion, and bloc voting by the majority that usually defeats the minority’s preferred candidates) (Thornburg v. Gingles (1986)). Recent Section 2 cases—like Allen v. Milligan—have opened more opportunities for Black voters, even as other decisions (e.g., Brnovich v. DNC (2021)) set stricter guideposts for vote-denial claims.
The best short-term backstop is in the states. Independent or citizen-led commissions, strong transparency, and clear redistricting criteria can check the worst abuses. Commissions are typically created by state constitutional amendment or statute—often via voter initiative (e.g., AZ 2000; CA 2008/2010; CO & MI 2018) or legislative referral (e.g., VA 2020). As of 2024–25, eleven states use commissions for congressional districts (Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Virginia, Washington). Wisconsin’s 2024 state-court process, while not a commission, shows how state law can move outcomes closer to voter preferences.
But state-by-state fixes produce uneven protection. A democracy worthy of the name needs national guardrails. Congress could ban partisan gerrymandering, restore preclearance with a modern coverage formula, and adopt clear criteria that protect communities of interest. Status check: The Freedom to Vote Act was introduced in the 118th Congress but did not become law; the John R. Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act has been introduced in the 119th Congress (H.R. 14, March 2025) and is pending in committee.
A bolder path looks beyond better lines under the same rules. Multi-member districts with ranked-choice voting (e.g., the Fair Representation Act) would convert “safe seats” into proportional, voter-driven representation; opening datasets/algorithms, expanding independent audits, and banning mid-decade remaps would make cartography a transparent public good. Ending “prison gerrymandering” by counting incarcerated people at their home address—an approach already adopted by numerous states—would stop quiet population shifts that dilute urban representation.
Bottom line: the most durable fix is independent, citizen-led redistricting commissions in every state, paired with clear, enforceable criteria.
Engagement Resources
- Brennan Center for Justice (www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/redistricting-litigation-roundup-0): Redistricting research, litigation tracker, and explainer series on the current cycle and reform options.
- All About Redistricting (redistricting.lls.edu/state/ohio/?cycle=2020&level=Congress&startdate=2022-03-02): State-by-state law, process guides, and case summaries for practitioners and advocates.
- Princeton Gerrymandering Project (gerrymander.princeton.edu/redistricting-report-card/): Redistricting Report Card and methods that link math and law; useful for map evaluation and public comment.
- Prison Policy Initiative / Prison Gerrymandering Project (prisonersofthecensus.org/): Campaigns, state lists, and how-tos to end prison-based gerrymandering.
- FairVote (fairvote.org/press/fair-representation-act-2025/): The Fair Representation Act and resources on multi-member districts with ranked-choice voting.
USRESIST SHARE: August 2025 #1
We are pleased to send you the current issue of USRESIST SHARE—our bi-weekly magazine of the latest news Briefs by our Reporters. USRESIST SHARE is intended to deepen your understanding of today’s leading public policy and political issues. We hope you’ll enjoy and welcome your feedback.
Law and Order or Overreach? When Soldiers Become Police (Immigration Policy Brief #191)
Immigration Policy Brief #191 | Morgan Davidson | August 17, 2025
Summary
As summer draws to an end, President Trump is once again utilizing federal military forces for law enforcement, this time in the nation’s capital. In California, Trump cited immigration protests for the use of the National Guard & ultimately the deployment of U.S. Marines. Now we see the President citing crime & the inability of D.C. Democrats to stop it. President Trump’s coast-to-coast use of federal military force in Los Angeles and Washington, D.C. during 2025 highlights the growing tensions between public safety, constitutional boundaries, and presidential power, raising critical questions about the future of American democracy and civil-military relations.
Analysis
The legal framework governing domestic military force is defined by the Posse Comitatus Act and the Insurrection Act, but Trump’s recent actions reveal the ambiguity of these laws and their potential for executive overreach. The Posse Comitatus Act was signed by Rutherford B. Hayes in 1878 in response to the use of the military as law enforcement during Reconstruction following the Civil War. The act prohibits the U.S. military from enforcing domestic law or acting as law enforcement unless explicitly given permission by Congress or through the Constitution. The Insurrection Act allows the President to deploy military forces to act as law enforcement to “suppress insurrection & repel invasions”. While that wording may seem clear & the situation in D.C. fails to meet those requirements, we still see Trump deploy military forces to act as police in our nation’s capital. With a President eager to utilize military forces as law enforcement across U.S. cities, a complicit Congress, & a Supreme Court that continually affirms the expansion of executive power, it is no surprise to see the military used as police in 2 U.S. cities with Trump wishing to do the same in Chicago & New York.
Trump’s federalization of the California National Guard and deployment of Marines to Los Angeles marked a rare and controversial use of military force against civilian protests, sparking immediate legal challenges. In June 2025, Los Angeles became the first major U.S. city where Trump moved beyond threats and fully exercised federal control over state forces. Citing escalating immigration protests and unrest, Trump federalized the California National Guard and deployed about 700 U.S. Marines under Joint Task Force 51, with an additional 2,000 Guard members placed on standby. California officials immediately challenged the move. Governor Gavin Newsom sued in federal court, arguing that Trump’s order violated the Posse Comitatus Act and trampled on state sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment. A federal judge initially granted a temporary restraining order halting the deployment, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals quickly stayed the decision, allowing the Guard and Marines to remain under federal command while the case proceeded. The episode underscored the unsettled constitutional boundaries around domestic use of the military and deepened partisan divides, with Trump framing the move as decisive leadership while critics warned it amounted to an authoritarian show of force.
In August 2025, Trump declared a “Crime Emergency” under the D.C. Home Rule Act and placed the Metropolitan Police Department under federal control. He ordered roughly 800 National Guard troops into the city and brought in additional units from West Virginia, South Carolina, and Ohio, raising the total force to well over a thousand. While the Guard was officially limited to logistics and support, reports soon surfaced that some units were preparing for armed patrols alongside local police. The deployment immediately drew resistance from city leaders, who noted that crime had already been trending downward and argued that federal intervention undermined D.C.’s fragile self-governance. Civil liberties groups, including the ACLU, warned that the operation blurred the traditional line between civilian law enforcement and military force. Trump, however, defended the move as proof of his resolve to restore order in Democratic-run cities, and he openly suggested that Chicago and New York could be next.
Taken together, the Los Angeles and D.C. interventions illustrate Trump’s willingness to test constitutional limits, generating fierce opposition from state officials, courts, and civil rights organizations. In California, Governor Gavin Newsom immediately positioned himself as Trump’s foil, challenging the federalization of the National Guard in court and warning that the President had crossed a constitutional line. While the courts initially slowed Trump’s actions, the Ninth Circuit’s decision to stay the lower ruling underscored how fragile the guardrails truly are when judicial deference to executive power is the norm. In Washington, D.C., local leaders voiced similar outrage, but their ability to resist was even more constrained. By invoking the D.C. Home Rule Act, Trump sidestepped local autonomy almost entirely, demonstrating how the nation’s capital provides a unique venue for executive power to be flexed without meaningful checks. Civil liberties groups like the ACLU warned that these deployments set a dangerous precedent for the normalization of military involvement in routine law enforcement, a trend that could spread to other cities. At the same time, Trump’s supporters framed both interventions as proof of his strength and his willingness to do what Democrats could not or would not do: “restore order.” The result is a sharp divide in how Americans interpret the same actions, authoritarian overreach to some, decisive leadership to others, with the courts and political institutions increasingly reluctant or unable to resolve the tension.
The precedent set by Trump’s actions risks normalizing the use of military force as a domestic political tool, threatening the balance between civilian governance and military neutrality. By ordering Guard troops and even active-duty Marines into American cities, Trump has blurred the line between soldiers and police in a way that undermines long-standing democratic norms. The civil-military divide, a crucial pillar of American democracy, depends on the military remaining above partisan politics. Yet, Trump has repeatedly cast deployments in explicitly political terms, presenting them as proof of his ability to impose “law and order” where Democratic officials have failed. If left unchecked, these episodes could serve as ready-made blueprints for future presidents who might see military intervention in civilian affairs not as a last resort, but as an acceptable tool of governance. Each deployment chips away at the assumption that law enforcement is local and civilian-led, replacing it with a model in which federal power is backed by troops in uniform. The danger is not simply Trump’s use of force in 2025, but the possibility that his actions will erode constitutional guardrails and normalize the military’s role in policing American streets.
Engagement Resources
- Brennan Center- Understanding Posse Comitatus Act: A good primer on the Posse Comitatus Act & its history.
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/posse-comitatus-act-explained - Brennan Center- Understanding Insurrection Act: The Brennan Center explores, explains, & suggests reforms for the Insurrection Act.
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/insurrection-act-explained - Trump Threatens Other U.S. Cities with Use of Federal Military Force : CNN covers Trump’s future plans for other cities including Chicago, New York, & L.A.
https://www.cnn.com/2025/08/12/politics/trump-federalized-dc-crime-home-rule-act-hnk
Immigration Report
USRESIST NEWS presents a special report on Immigration Policy. This report entails the immigration policy briefs by our news team over the last 6 months.
The Downsizing of Student Learning Assessments (Education Policy Brief #208)
Education Policy Brief #208 | Steve Piazza | August 17. 2025
As the Trump Administration carries out its crusade to reduce the size of government, one of the targets has been the Department of Education (DOE). The DOE is made up of a number of agencies and offices that have been severely impacted by these actions, one of which is the Institute of Education Sciences (IES).
The IES, considered the evaluative and statistical arm of the DOE, is charged with, amongst other things, producing and reporting on the results of the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP, often referred to as the Nation’s Report Card). This enormous task is performed by one of the four agencies under IES, the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES).
Such reductions have far reaching implications when it comes to assessing the progress of students across the country and in comparison to the rest of the world. More than record keeping, these analyses assist in the development of policy and decisions about funding to states and local education agencies nationwide. Not only that, relevant comparisons help identify disparities so that support finds its way to where it’s needed most.
Not coincidentally, it appears that the NCES missed their deadline for reporting this past year’s results, most likely since their staff of 800 is reportedly now just down to a handful due to the administration’s actions. The DOE says that the reports are going to be handled by another agency, but what has resulted for this round is a vague snapshot rather than an in depth view that is a valuable resource for states.
The effect this might have on student achievement is anyone’s guess, but having such statistics unavailable should be alarming to lawmakers and policy makers as they run head on into the complexity of basing decisions on incomplete data regarding student performance.
Policy Analysis
The extent of the danger in diminishing or eliminating the important work of national data collection on student assessment regarding performance and graduation is best understood in terms of what it does and does not provide.
The NAEP, issued periodically to grades 4, 8 and 12, provides comparative data on how students in the country perform as a whole. For example, the reporting shows that the average 2024 score for all students Grades 4 and 8 in Math have gone up or stayed the same as the previous cycles of testing (2022), while for Reading there’s been a decrease in scores for that time period. All of these are lower than from pre-Covid levels.
Drilling down even more reveals that states may or may not themselves be consistent across grade levels and subject matter. Again, using the most recent reporting year (2024), a state such as Massachusetts leads the country in each grade tested in Math and Reading, whereas Florida is near the top in 4th Grade Reading but is below the national average in the rest of the categories.
It will be interesting to see if these patterns remain the next time the NAEP is administered in 2026. There is already a bit of confusion on the NCES site as it states that Math and Reading assessments for 4th and 8th grade are scheduled for January, 2026, but then it goes on to says it’s also piloting new assessments for 4th, 8th, and 12th in public schools as its updating its testing frameworks. The reason for omitting private schools in the pilot is not provided, but it can only add to degrading the integrity of results.
The tracking of scores around high school graduation is more complicated since less secondary students take the NAEP as it’s voluntary. Still the comparison is available and can offer some insight. It should be noted that IES does not report on graduation exams because states are charged with setting standards and administering all tests, and states may drastically differ. At present, only six states have graduation exit exams: Florida, Louisiana, New Jersey, Ohio, Texas, and Virginia. Massachusetts and New York have eliminated them or are in the process of doing so. Over all, this is a reduction of 18 states since 2013.
On a global scale, the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) provides valuable statistics on how U.S. students stack up against the rest of the world. For example, it can be useful to know the last time the PISA was given (2022), the U.S. showed a ranking of 31st in Math and Reading according to World Population Review.
NCES oversees the U.S. involvement with the PISA. And since each nation has differing approaches to educational governance, negotiating multiple international bureaucracies with deceased personnel is complicated enough. Also, Trump Administration actions cannot be blamed for the past test cycle’s one-year delay due to the pandemic, but after the unsteadiness of the current round of testing (already delayed since it was scheduled for Spring, 2025) and the recent decision to increase the time between future tests from every three years to four, the recent chaos created by the Executive Branch is most likely the cause.
The future of PISA might be unclear, but what is clear is that without it we cannot see if the U.S progresses beyond where it was in 2022. Again, reducing the amount of information available could artificially improve that ranking, but playing the statistics game is not the same as teaching students to progress in their ability to read or solve math problems. It’s vital the country knows that the U.S. has been slipping, and by not having these results it will be hard to measure where it stands.
Overall, whether the IES is in the business of reporting critical aspects of achievement or not, if these comparisons did not exist, or that results were incomplete or tampered down, states might find themselves going it alone and managing funds would become an exercise based on arbitrary decisions that could only lead to grumblings of more political inequities than already exist. Many students could even face an unrealistic understanding of where they rank particularly when they have an eye toward college.
There’s a reason independent agencies like these exist. Simply put, large amounts of useful data are still cumbersome. Neglecting to maintain a reasonable measure of containment via impartial yet scientific analyses makes it meaningless and subject to arbitrary conclusions that only muddle students’ rankings, home and abroad.
We have seen what happens when politics plays into the reduction and manipulation of available data. This should sound an alarm that students may grow up to be adults not even being able to understand how the weakened system has failed them.
Engagement Resources
FairTest provides information on testing best practices and works towards improving the benefits that student assessment may provide.
The Education Commission of the States provides a good overview of student testing here.
The U.S. Government Turns the Other Cheek to Resolving the Israel–Palestinian Conflict (Foreign Policy Brief #215)
Foreign Policy Brief #215 | Inijah Quadri | August 15, 2025
Under the Trump administration, U.S. policy has shifted in tone, language, and substance: Washington has openly embraced Israeli priorities while sidelining Palestinian rights and claims. What had long been presented as a balancing act—security guarantees for Israel paired with a rhetorical commitment to Palestinian statehood—has become a policy that favors one side almost exclusively.
For decades, Washington has treated Israel’s security as a core U.S. interest while promising a path to Palestinian self-determination. That approach rests on a stream of military aid set in a ten-year memorandum, emergency wartime funds and frequent weapons sales, and occasional political dialogue about a cease-fire and a two-state solution. After the war expanded out of Gaza (into Lebanon, Yemen and the West Bank)in late 2023, the United States briefly slowed a shipment of heavy bombs on humanitarian grounds but kept the larger pipeline open and later green-lit additional major packages. U.S. support also includes Israel’s layered air defenses: Congress provided roughly $4 billion in April 2024 to replenish Iron Dome and David’s Sling.
Diplomatically, the United States has leaned on its veto at the United Nations to block texts that demand an immediate, unconditional ceasefire, arguing that any deal must also address hostages and Hamas. A Qatar- and Egypt-brokered truce early this year did lead to hostage–prisoner exchanges, but it collapsed within weeks and the fighting resumed. At the Security Council, any one of the five permanent members can block a “substantive” resolution with a single negative vote; as of June 4, 2025, Washington has used that veto on Israel/Palestine matters roughly 50 times, including ceasefire texts on December 8, 2023; February 20 and November 20, 2024; and June 4, 2025, and a resolution on April 18, 2024 that would have advanced full U.N. membership for the State of Palestine. Since May–June 2024, several European states have recognized Palestine as a state—Spain, Ireland, and Norway on May 28, 2024, and Slovenia on June 4, 2024—while France has announced it will recognize Palestine in September 2025 and the United Kingdom has said it will move to recognize at the September 2025 U.N. General Assembly unless Israel meets conditions (cease-fire, more aid access, no annexation, and a renewed peace process); recognition increases diplomatic standing and typically upgrades missions to embassies but does not confer U.N. membership, which the U.S. vetoed on April 18, 2024.
Washington has also repeatedly convened or brokered negotiations—Madrid/Oslo (1991–1993), Camp David and Taba (2000–2001), Annapolis (2007–2008), and the Kerry talks (2013–2014); under Trump it unveiled the 2020 “Peace to Prosperity” plan and, since October 2023, has engaged in intensive shuttle diplomacy alongside Qatar and Egypt. Biden’s relationship with Netanyahu featured public friction (criticism of settlement expansion, a May 2024 pause on 2,000-lb bombs, and months without a White House invitation during Israel’s 2023 judicial overhaul), whereas Trump aligned closely with Netanyahu’s agenda (embassy move to Jerusalem, recognition of Israeli sovereignty on the Golan, reversal of the settlements legal stance) and in 2025 appointed an ambassador who shares Israel’s far-right rhetoric.
The 2018 relocation of the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem effectively recognized Israel’s claim to the city’s undivided capital, prompted closure of the stand-alone U.S. Consulate that handled Palestinian affairs, and led a small set of countries (e.g., Guatemala, Honduras, Kosovo, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay) to follow suit—moves Palestinians viewed as prejudging a core final-status issue. The current U.S. Ambassador to Israel is Mike Huckabee, a conservative evangelical and longtime supporter of West Bank settlement expansion; in June 2025 he stated that the United States is no longer pursuing an independent Palestinian state, frequently referring to the West Bank as “Judea and Samaria.”
Beyond Gaza, U.S. policy has tried to curb West Bank violence in fits and starts. The previous administration said settlement expansion conflicts with international law and created a sanctions tool against violent settlers; the current administration scrapped both the tool and the designations. It also revoked a White House memo that had added extra humanitarian-law checks to arms transfers. In parallel, Congress froze U.S. government funding to the U.N. agency that serves Palestinian refugees and has not restored it, forcing aid to move through narrower channels. Trump officials have also announced U.S.–Israel-run food distribution centers in Gaza and backed a “Gaza Humanitarian Foundation” to operate limited aid hubs, but with UNRWA still frozen, these ad-hoc channels have delivered uneven coverage and protection for aid workers.
On August 22, 2025, U.N.-backed experts formally confirmed famine in Gaza City, projecting over 640,000 people at IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) by late September absent major access improvements; U.N. agencies attribute the crisis to man-made access constraints and have called for unhindered humanitarian access. Despite Israeli announcements easing some restrictions, aid groups reported as recently as August 20, 2025 that key shelter materials still were not being allowed in, underscoring persistent access barriers.
Analysis
US policy towards Israel has not shifted enough toward rights, law, and accountability. Security aid and weapon sales continue without binding, enforceable conditions. A brief pause on the largest bombs did not become a policy of consistent leverage tied to civilian protection, access for aid, and an end to collective punishment. Trump’s repeal of the humanitarian-law memoweakened oversight at the very moment when it was most needed. The same period saw the administration lift sanctions on violent settlers and remove designees, even as U.N. monitors recorded the highest monthly rate of settler attacks injuring Palestinians in at least two decades and repeated community displacements across the West Bank.
At the United Nations, the veto shield narrows nonviolent options and signals to Israeli leaders that there is little cost for rejecting ceasefire language supported by nearly every other member. That posture also sidelines Palestinian rights claims in global forums and delays pressure for a durable political settlement. It also blocked momentum on Palestinian membership, which—paired with clear commitments on security—could have anchored a political horizon instead of another cycle of indefinite “temporary” arrangements. On April 18, 2024, the U.S. vetoed a Security Council resolution recommending Palestine’s full U.N. membership; as of June 4, 2025, the U.S. also vetoed an immediate, unconditional, and permanent Gaza cease-fire backed by 14 of 15 Council members.
On the West Bank, Trump’s ending of the settler-violence sanctions and removing several names from the Treasury list stripped away one of the only U.S. tools aimed at curbing daily abuses under occupation. It tells perpetrators and the officials who enable them that Washington’s priority is political alignment, not equal protection under the law. Reversing the sanctions also undercuts earlier statements that settlement expansion violates international law.
Humanitarian policy remains piecemeal. With U.N. refugee-agency funding cut off by statute and not restored, needs of people affected by the conflicts in the region have only grown. A rights-first frame would restore and expand funding and pair it with protection for aid workers and civilians across Gaza, the West Bank, and the entire region. That restoration should include not only UNRWA but also robust, unimpeded operating access for neutral aid actors—including U.S. NGOs—so they can move food, fuel, and medical supplies at scale. U.S. funding to UNRWA was suspended in 2024 and remains frozen under U.S. law and subsequent executive action in 2025.
Policies toward a two-state outcome have diverged sharply: Biden reaffirmed two states and re-stated that settlements are “inconsistent with international law,” while Trump’s 2020 plan supported a demilitarized, truncated Palestinian state under extensive Israeli security control. In 2025, his envoy has said Washington is no longer pursuing an independent Palestinian state at all. Meanwhile, Israel’s governing coalition continues to depend on far-right parties led by Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir, whose positions have shaped war policy; reporting in July–August 2025 highlighted their pressure for maximalist military objectives, and in August the court scheduled intensified testimony in Prime Minister Netanyahu’s long-running bribery, fraud, and breach-of-trust trial (with hearings ordered three times per week from November 2025).
Accountability is also seen to be being pulled in the opposite direction. Trump sanctioned officials at the International Criminal Court over their Israel-related work. A federal judge has recently blocked enforcement of these sanctions, but Trump’s action spotlights a double standard: Washington urges rule-of-law abroad while punishing those who try to apply it to an ally. A consistent, universal approach would support independent investigations, not suppress them. Legally, the “genocide” question is before the International Court of Justice in South Africa v. Israel: the Court has not ruled on the merits but has three times (Jan. 26, Mar. 28, and May 24, 2024) ordered provisional measures—including to prevent acts under the Genocide Convention, enable humanitarian aid, and, on May 24, to halt Israel’s offensive in Rafah—citing the risk to protected rights; U.N. experts have warned of a risk of genocide. Jimmy Carter’s major public critique focused on “apartheid” (2006), not on being the first to accuse genocide.
Cease-fire status as at now: Hamas has said it accepted a mediator-drafted proposal for a 60-day truce with phased hostage-prisoner exchanges and partial Israeli pullouts; Israel has not agreed, with Prime Minister Netanyahu saying talks would resume only “on terms acceptable to Israel” while authorizing operations to seize Gaza City.
The way forward is not mysterious. Make every weapons transfer contingent on verifiable compliance with humanitarian law and real-time access for aid. End the automatic U.N. veto and back an immediate, durable ceasefire tied to equal rights and freedom of movement for Palestinians. Restore UNRWA funding and support Palestinian statehood alongside security for Israelis and Palestinians alike. At the same time, remove administrative barriers so vetted U.S. and international NGOs can scale food, water, health, and shelter operations across Gaza and the West Bank without political interference. Without those shifts, U.S. policy continues to allow the conflict to continue rather than end it, and the human cost mounts.
Taken together, the Trump administration’s record shows a decisive break from prior U.S. rhetoric of “balance.” By embracing Israeli government positions, reversing even modest checks on settlements and arms oversight, and declaring the two-state framework defunct, Washington has signaled that Palestinian rights are not a priority. This shift in tone, policy, and language marks a clear departure from past administrations—and has entrenched rather than resolved the conflict.
Engagement Resources
- OCHA oPt (https://www.ochaopt.org/): The U.N.’s humanitarian coordination hub for Gaza and the West Bank, with situation reports, access analysis, and datasets.
- UNRWA (https://www.unrwa.org/): The U.N. agency delivering education, health care, and relief for Palestine refugees across the region, including Gaza and the West Bank.
- OHCHR — State of Palestine (https://www.ohchr.org/en/countries/palestine): The U.N. human rights office monitoring and reporting on violations in the occupied Palestinian territory.
- Congressional Research Service (https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R47828): Nonpartisan U.S. briefing on the conflict, U.S. policy, and options for Congress.
- ACRI (https://www.english.acri.org.il): The Association for Civil Rights in Israel, advancing civil and human rights for all under Israeli control.
Suggestions for the Democratic 2026 Mid-Term Platform
The 2026 mid-term elections offer the Democratic party an opportunity to regain control of the House and Senate. However, Democrats face an uphill battle challenged by Trump policies, anti-Democratic rhetoric, internal divisions, and political maneuvers such as re-districting. To address these challenges the Democratics need to articulate a political platform with issues that resonate with voters. While the need in every race is to prioritize concerns of local communities, a set of party-wide policy priorities that can be adapted to fit local needs would be helpful.
It is especially important that these the 2026 Democratic platform advocates policies that affect voters that have recently felt ignored by Democrats; for example, younger voters, workers, and those living in rural areas. This may require taking a more progressive, government intervention left-leaning stance.
The Democrats also need to steer clear of tit-for-tat politics, e.g. trying to reverse all of Trump’s Executive Orders (ignore most of them for the time being) and cast their messages in a positive light.
Here are some suggestions for issues that should be on this platform.
- Lower pocketbook Costs— Including lowering cost of groceries, rent subsidies, low-cost transportation, and health care
- Education Reform — Support the renewed interest in civics but how is it being taught
- Fight against oligarchy and the concentration of wealth and power in the hands of the few; promote tax reform and the overturn of Citizens United.
- Support our allies on foreign policy issues; renew support for Ukraine and put pressure on Israel to end the war in Gaza
- Denounce civil rights violations such as ICE raids and political violence and put forward a proposal for immigration reform.
- Increase support for the use of renewable energy and climate friendly policies.
- Support the regulation of information technologies, such as AI and social media.