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Compiled and written by Stella Jordan (stella@usresistnews.org)

Developments in the Investigations

The world of the Russia investigations over the past few weeks has been reeling from a whirlwind of surprising developments, including the conclusion of one of the most public investigations: Republicans on the House Intelligence Committee announced last week that the investigative portion of their probe was over, and released a preliminary report denying any evidence of collusion on behalf of the Trump campaign, and even refuting some of the intelligence community’s conclusions about Russian interference in the 2016 election; the report delighted the President, who tweeted its highlights immediately. Democrats on the Committee vehemently disagreed with the majority’s conclusions, and released their own report in dissent. Prior to the conclusion of their investigation, the House Intelligence Committee interviewed a handful of noncompliant high-profile administration affiliates, about which there was much speculation. All this amidst multiple accusations of leaks of witness testimony and classified evidence, supposedly emanating from House Intelligence leadership.

Other investigation-related shakeups include Trump’s firing of retiring former deputy FBI director Andrew McCabe, and the resignation of the President’s special counsel investigation lawyer, John Dowd, amidst more speculation about a potential impending meeting between Trump and Mueller. Dowd and Trump had seemingly been at odds for some time over the White House response–and Trump’s spontaneous responses­–to the Russia investigation, with Dowd cautioning cooperation in an increasingly aggressive climate. The White House legal team seems poised to replace Dowd with a new lawyer, Joseph DiGenova, amidst speculation that the President is heading down a more antagonistic path apropos the special counsel investigation, which Trump has been doubling down on his efforts to undermine.

Last week the Trump administration announced a series of sanctions on Russian actors in response to 2016 political interference and related cyberattacks. This is a singular move in an administration uniquely sympathetic towards Russia; such sanctions would likely have been imposed summarily and much sooner by other presidents, and were imposed by Trump only after Congressional legislation and increasing international pressure obliged it. These new sanctions echo the special counsel’s indictment last month, directed at the same organizations and individuals, in addition to a number of other actors involved in unrelated cyberattacks in 2016, including attacks on US infrastructure. Many of the new sanctions simply reinforced previous sanctions imposed by Trump and his predecessor, and seem unlikely to have much impact on future Russian activity.

Since his indictments of Russian nationals and businesses last month, special counsel Robert Mueller has continued to generate headlines and speculation about progress in and targets of his Russia investigation. Recent developments include his subpoena for Russia-related documents from the Trump Organization, which casts a wide net and implicates many of Trump’s close associates and family members, and suggests that the special counsel is also interested in potential improprieties related to the President’s business and foreign financial ties. Mueller has also been investigating a secret meeting in the Seychelles last January between a prominent American businessman and Trump ally, and a prominent Russian businessman with Kremlin connections, allegedly intended to establish a backchannel between the US and Russian governments. Mueller also interviewed former Trump campaign aide Sam Nunberg, who had very publicly refused to comply with a special counsel subpoena before changing course. All of this in more detail below.

In addition to all that, the special counsel is reportedly looking into the President’s questioning of Mueller’s witnesses–White House counsel Don McGahn and former chief of staff Reince Priebus–about the content of their interviews. Although legally this does not necessarily constitute witness tampering, it could play into the larger probe of obstruction of justice, and could also be a concern if Trump has his own interview with Mueller and has knowledge of what other witnesses already told the special counsel. White House lawyers have been negotiating with the special counsel about a possible interview with the President, and are reportedly seeking to negotiate a deal in which Trump would appear for questioning in exchange for Mueller setting a prompt date to end his Russia investigation.

DoJ & Special Counsel

The latest to fall in the ongoing battle between the President and the Justice Department, former deputy FBI director Andrew McCabe, was fired by Trump last week. McCabe was about to officially retire after a long career at the FBI, marked by two of the bureau’s most politically controversial cases into both of the 2016 Presidential nominees, which ultimately ushered in his downfall. The DoJ is currently conducting a large internal investigation, probing how the FBI managed–and is managing–the Clinton email investigation and the Trump-Russia investigation, among other things. McCabe oversaw both investigations, and what apparently sparked his improbable dismissal was AG Jeff Sessions’ accusations that McCabe had “lacked candor” when questioned by the Inspector General as part of the internal probe. Although Sessions said that other FBI officials, including director Christopher Wray, had recommended McCabe’s dismissal and claimed that the move was not politically motivated, the President had been attacking McCabe on Twitter for months and had publicly harangued Sessions for not replacing him sooner. Trump’s animosity towards McCabe seems to stem both from McCabe’s affiliation with former FBI director James Comey, and Clinton-affiliated campaign donations to McCabe’s wife for an unsuccessful bid for state senate. McCabe was also involved in the FBI’s Russia investigation from the very start, and kept memos of his conversations with both Comey and Trump, which could prove very useful to the special counsel investigation; McCabe is reportedly concerned that his firing is part of a broader White House play to undermine his credibility as a possible witness and to discredit the special counsel investigation by association. The DoJ Inspector General’s report on the FBI, including the specific allegations against McCabe, is expected to be released this spring.

The Seychelles meeting that the special counsel is currently investigating is a complicated event further obscured by rather unreliable and at times conflicting accounts of the people involved. It seems that Mueller was tipped off to the meeting by a businessman and foreign political consultant who helped set it up; George Nader, who appears to have close ties to Trump and reportedly has visited the White House several times over the past year, is also an adviser to the ruler of the United Arab Emirates and a potential lobbyist on that country’s behalf. Nader had come under special counsel scrutiny due to his UEA-backed lobbying efforts, and was apparently being interviewed about the possibility of the UEA having tried to buy political influence in Washington through indirect donations to Trump’s campaign when he told Mueller about the meeting. This of course ties into a larger issue under investigation: the trail of foreign money and influence on the Trump administration. Nader has apparently been involved in lobbying Trump directly on behalf of UEA interests and in conjunction with US business interests, prominently including military and private security contractors seeking Middle East deals. Nader has been advising the UEA’s crown prince and acting military-political leader, and seems to have provided a gateway for US business in the UEA, as well as advocating US foreign policy beneficial to the UEA. Indeed, Trump has been supportive of UEA interests and leadership, breaking with prior US policy and reportedly ignoring his national security advisers in supporting the Emirates’ blockade of Qatar and other regional power bids.

So what does the Seychelles meeting have to do with all of this? Nader, who has since testified before a grand jury and met with special counsel investigators multiple times, was apparently the meeting’s organizer or facilitator, although it is unclear exactly whose interests he was working to facilitate. He reportedly told the special counsel that the meeting’s purpose was to discuss future US-Russia relations and a potential communications backchannel. The meeting’s main attendees were Erik Prince, a large Trump donor and the founder of the military contracting company Blackwater, and Kirill Dmitriev, the CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund. Both men appear to have ties to their countries’ respective leaders. The issue is further complicated by an interview Prince gave last fall to the House Intelligence Committee, which appears to have contradicted Nader’s account of the meeting. Prince told the Committee that the meeting had been informal and was organized last-minute by a UEA official, which reportedly conflicts with Nader’s testimony about the meeting’s inception. All of this is important to the special counsel from the broader lens of foreign influence on the Trump campaign and administration, and what impact all of these business and financial relationships had on Trump. Mueller’s recent subpoena of documents and records from the Trump Organization may also help shed more light on such relationships and transactions.

Another highly public development in the special counsel’s investigation is the grand jury testimony last week of Sam Nunberg, an ex-Trump campaign aide who was fired early on over problematic social media posts. Nunberg’s testimony, along with document and communication record requests, had been subpoenaed by the special counsel, and earlier in the week Nunberg had surprised and provoked the media by calling into multiple shows to declare his refusal to comply with the subpoena. In his media circuit, Nunberg denounced Mueller and his investigation, but also attacked Trump and other members of the administration. He told reporters that he thought Mueller had evidence against Trump, based on his previous private interview with special counsel investigators, and said that the special counsel had tried to flip him on Roger Stone over collusion with Russia. Nunberg, who is often called a protégé of Stone’s, told the Washington Post that Mueller’s subpoena had specifically requested his communication records with Stone, Steve Bannon, Michael Cohen, Corey Lewandowski, Hope Hicks, and Paul Manafort. By all accounts Nunberg’s media blitz seemed angry, doubtful and almost unhinged, and shortly after declaring his intention to refuse the subpoena he told the AP that he was considering cooperating after all. Nunberg was a relatively minor player in the campaign, whose tenure with Trump was short-lived, and in my opinion much gratuitous and unnecessary coverage was given to his media antics. However, in revealing some of the details of his subpoena, Nunberg did provide an interesting glimpse into what Mueller is looking for; Bannon, Cohen and Stone, along with the other administration officials the subpoena mentioned, are or were extremely close to Trump and important to the campaign, and thus far all have denied any connections to Russia or knowledge of collusion.

Finally, recent reports have dredged up former Trump campaign aide George Papadopolous, who pleaded guilty last year to lying to the FBI about his Russia-related communications during the campaign and began cooperating with the special counsel investigation. Information connected to Papadopolous actually sparked the initial FBI investigation into Russian interference in the election; he had received information about thousands of stolen Democratic emails which apparently contained ‘dirt’ on Clinton in the spring of 2016–apparently before the DNC realized it had been hacked–about which he told an Australian diplomat in the UK. That diplomat eventually alerted the US after WikiLeaks began to publish the emails months later, which set off the FBI’s probe. Papadopolous received the information about the emails from an enigmatic Maltese professor and former diplomat with connections to the Russian government and intelligence community, Joseph Mifsud. Mifsud had apparently learned of the emails on a trip to Russia. In January Papadopolous’ girlfriend–now his wife–told the FBI that Mifsud had fed Papadopoulos information during the campaign and encouraged him to try to set up meetings between campaign officials and the Russian government; Mifsud appears to have facilitated many of Papadopoulos’ foreign contacts.

Newly released emails reportedly indicate that Papadopoulos had more extensive contact with senior Trump campaign officials regarding his Russia forays than was previously thought, and had campaign approval for at least some of his Russia-related communications. During the campaign Papadopolous was contacted by a Russian news agency to give an interview, and his campaign superiors encouraged him to accept, and to emphasize Trump’s openness to building a better US-Russia relationship, underscoring cooperation in Syria and other international conflicts. The emails also show that Papadopoulos had communicated with such senior campaign officials as Flynn and Bannon, and prior to the election worked with Bannon to set up a meeting between Trump and the President of Egypt; Papadopolous seemingly grew into a sort of middleman role, facilitating contact between foreign governments and the Trump campaign, and reportedly continued to do so even after the election.

According to Papadopoulos, Trump himself apparently expressed interest when Papadopolous brought up the possibility of setting up a pre-election meeting with Putin, although this idea was shot down by Manafort and other top campaign officials. However, Papadopolous, with the at least tacit encouragement of other superiors on the campaign, continued networking and exploring the possibility of other meetings with Russian government affiliates. It is still unclear what, if anything, the Trump campaign may have gained from Papadopoulos’ attempts to establish contact with the Russian government, but if Papadopoulos knew about the DNC hacks prior to the release of the emails, it does seem more likely that other members of the Trump campaign may also have been aware that Russia had information that would damage the Clinton campaign prior to the explicit offer of such ‘dirt’ at the Trump Tower meeting.

House Intelligence Committee

The House Intelligence Committee’s Republican leadership has terminated the investigative stage of their Russia probe, and released a summary of their final report. The conclusions are unsurprising insofar as the report refutes not only any evidence of collusion on the part of the Trump campaign with regards to Russian interference in the election, but also disputes the unanimous intelligence community conclusion that Russia acted in support of candidate Trump. The summary also indicates that the final report, when made public, will include discussion of both the Steele dossier and intelligence leaks, or “problematic contacts” between the intelligence community and the media, bolstering Trump and his supporters’ claims that the DoJ is biased against the President and that the broader DoJ Russia investigation is somehow tainted by extension. The findings and conclusion of the summary echo Committee chairman Devin Nunes’ various focuses throughout the investigation, many of which seemed like poorly veiled efforts to protect the President and undermine the rest of the intelligence community’s investigations of him. Throughout the House Intelligence Committee’s investigation, Democrats accused Republicans of bending to executive pressure and not taking the inquiry seriously, and called the investigation’s conclusion “premature” and irresponsible. Committee Democrats published their own 21-page report outlining the most important aspects of the investigation that were left unfinished, including interviews, documents, and unresolved subpoenas relevant to the Committee’s earlier lines of inquiry and important to any subsequent conclusions.

Despite Democratic dissent, this week the Committee voted to release the full final report on their Russia investigation. Democrats are expected to release their own conclusions alongside the majority’s findings, and reportedly plan to continue the investigation on their own, although without majority backing they will be unable to issue subpoenas and will likely face mounting obstacles to collecting information. The Committee’s final report will now go to intelligence leaders for declassification, and will probably be released to the public in the next few weeks.

The House Intelligence Committee’s Russia investigation ended with testimony from a few final major witnesses, including former Trump campaign manager Corey Lewandowski and former White House communications director Hope Hicks. Lewandowski appeared voluntarily for a second interview with the Committee last week to address questions about his knowledge of the campaign after he had left it, which at first he had declined to discuss. However, according to Committee Democrats Lewandowski still refused to answer certain questions related to his knowledge of the Comey firing and potential conversations he had with the President about the special counsel. Hope Hicks, who announced her resignation the day after her interview with the Committee, made media waves after her interview with the admission that she had sometimes been obliged to tell ‘white lies’ on behalf of Trump, although she reportedly claimed that those had not included issues related to the Russia investigations. Hicks apparently did not formally invoke executive privilege when speaking with the Committee, but did refuse to answer many of the investigators’ questions about her time in the White House and presidential transition. Hicks had previously been interviewed by the special counsel and the Senate Intelligence Committee as well.

Unfortunately for Democrats on the House Intelligence Committee, hopes for the subpoenas they had called for to compel at least three major witnesses to answer their questions were dashed when Republicans closed the investigation. As the minority argued in their response to the Republicans’ final report, there are still many important witnesses the Committee should interview, as well as subpoenas it should issue and enforce after many of their witnesses refused to answer specific questions about the campaign and the White House. Perhaps the most important subpoena lost was that of Steve Bannon, who appeared before the Committee last month and was mostly silent in response to interviewers’ questions; in rare bipartisan agreement the Committee issued a subpoena for a second interview. When Bannon returned later in the month, however, he brought with him 25 questions dictated by the White House–which did not fully meet the criteria of the subpoena–and refused to provide answers to anything else. Exasperated Committee members on both sides wanted to hold Bannon in contempt of congress, a bureaucratic legal measure which would have needed approval from the entire House and ratification by Speaker Paul Ryan. The heart of the contempt issue was executive privilege and its limits: Bannon did not invoke executive privilege per se, but told lawmakers that he was remaining silent in order to protect the President’s right to use that privilege in the future, which seems not to be a sound legal basis for refusal to comply with a subpoena. The contempt idea obviously melted away after Republicans first announced their intention to wrap up the investigation.

Incidentally, a recent Politico report suggests that Bannon may have been picked up in the FBI’s surveillance of former campaign aide Carter Page last year. That surveillance, sanctioned by the controversial FISA warrant which was the subject of the Committee’s memo drama last month, covered Page’s electronic communications; Page told the House Intelligence Committee in the fall that he had spoken with Bannon on the phone about Russia and the Steele dossier last January, which was during the time he was being surveilled. This call with Bannon has not been independently verified, but could be of importance to the FBI if Bannon was in fact recorded discussing Russia and dossier-related matters, which he had previously denied doing.

In perhaps one of the final scandals to beset the House Intelligence Committee, recent reports suggest that classified information related to a witness’ testimony was leaked to none other than Trump’s personal attorney Michael Cohen, via Cohen’s own attorney. The testimony in question was from a private December interview with David Kramer, an associate of senator John McCain who had met with Christopher Steele last year and subsequently warned McCain about the gravity of the dossier’s contents. Kramer’s attorney accused Republicans on the House Intelligence Committee of leaking information about Kramer’s testimony to Cohen’s attorney, after the testimony was brought up in conversation between the two attorneys. Leaking witness testimony or contents of an interview is obviously against Committee rules; in response to Kramers’ demand for an explanation, Nunes took the bizarre action of subpoenaing Kramer to appear before the Committee again on short notice. The most important part about these allegations is that the ultimate recipient of the leaked information seems to be Cohen, who was personally implicated in the Steele dossier, and could have potentially passed on the information to Trump, which could in turn have undermined other witness interviews later in the investigation. Mike Conaway denied the allegations of any witness testimony being leaked by the Committee.

Senate Intelligence Committee

In yet another apparent leak scandal leading back to the House Intelligence Committee, the New York Times reported earlier in the month that leaders of the Senate Intelligence Committee–chairman Richard Burr and ranking member Mark Warner–had concluded that Republicans on their House counterpart had leaked private text messages between Warner and a Russian-connected Washington lawyer, Adam Waldman. The texts outline Warner’s attempts to set up a meeting with Christopher Steele, whom the Senate Intelligence Committee views as an important witness who could provide key information to their investigation. Waldman, who also has ties to Oleg Deripaska–the Russian oligarch made infamous for his connections in the Manafort case–knew Steele and apparently had offered to serve as an intermediary. The texts were leaked shortly after House Republicans released Nunes’ controversial memo last month, and according to the Times report the leak was extremely troubling for Burr and Warner, raising doubts about the House Intelligence Committee’s investigation and intentions; the two subsequently called a unique meeting with House Speaker Paul Ryan to present their findings and concerns. Burr later refuted the Times’ account that he and Warner had reached the conclusion that the texts were leaked by the House Intelligence Committee, and claimed that they had met with Ryan just to give an update on their investigation. It does seem, however, that Burr and Warner may have raised concerns during that meeting about Nunes and his staff’s conduct in the House’s investigation.

Ultimately it seems that Warner’s attempts to talk to Steele were unsuccessful, and the leaking of the texts was little more than political spin; after the leak Burr and Warner issued a joint statement and other Republicans on the Senate Intelligence Committee also told reporters that Warner had disclosed the communications to the entire committee at the outset, and no one had seen any impropriety in Warner’s outreach. Unlike their House counterparts, whose Russia investigation has been incessantly beset with partisanship and media frenzy, the Senate Intelligence Committee has been praised for its unbiased and cooperative approach, and Burr and Warner appear to have been closely collaborating to maintain both integrity and confidentiality in their investigation.

In other Senate Intelligence Committee news, investigators held a hearing last week on reforming the security clearance process–an important feature of the investigations into the Trump administration, given many officials’ failures to properly fill out security clearance forms and attempts to conceal information that would affect their ability to gain clearance. This problem has especially plagued Trump son-in-law and senior adviser Jared Kushner, whose temporary top clearance was recently downgraded after repeated nondisclosures of foreign and financial ties. The director of the National Background Investigation Bureau, which handles security clearance applications, told the Committee that concealments of ties to foreign governments–something which has plagued many Trump administration officials–is an especially significant impediment to a security clearance approval.

The Senate Intelligence Committee is also preparing a report on election vulnerabilities, which they hope to release by the end of the month in anticipation of the upcoming midterm elections. The report is part of their larger effort not just to investigate Russia’s 2016 election intervention, but also to educate the voting public and try to prevent future foreign electoral interference. This will be the Committee’s first publicly released report in their Russia investigation, and is expected to highlight existing problems in domestic electoral systems, rather than discuss the specifics of their ongoing investigation into Russia and collusion.

February 23, 2018

The Indictments

The special counsel dropped a bombshell in the Russia investigations last week, delivering 13 indictments of Russian nationals and organizations in relation to their online campaign to disrupt the 2016 election through promotion of fake stories and divisive narratives on social media and around the internet, as well as direct manipulation of unsuspecting Americans. Here is the public release of the official DoJ indictment, which lays out a long and extensive case against the defendants, and includes charges of conspiracy against the US, bank and wire fraud, and identity theft. The indictment does not include any explicit language on collusion, nor does it point to any evidence of American involvement in or knowledge of the Russian activity. The White House has seized on this point, also highlighting the indictment’s determination that the Russian interference had begun in 2014, prior to Trump’s candidacy.

With all the hype, it is easy to get lost in the details and reactions; in my opinion there are a few key takeaways from this recent move by Mueller. The indictments are incredibly specific about the Russians’ targeted interference in US politics, as well as their intention – directed by the Russian government – to support Trump’s candidacy and undermine Clinton’s in 2016. It is nearly impossible to determine if the Russian efforts actually did influence the election’s outcome, but to date this is the best legally-focused public indication of the scope of their operation. However, the indictment centers on cyber activity, especially social media manipulation, and financial frauds. Clearly this is not the endgame of the special counsel’s investigation; it reads more like a platform from which other related cases could be built, especially with the continued cooperation of a few key former campaign associates in Mueller’s investigation.

To my mind, there are two plausible outcomes regarding the question of collusion. Firstly, just because evidence of collusion was not included in this particular set of indictments, it does not mean that the special counsel lacks such evidence. He may be waiting for more witnesses to corroborate information, or simply choosing carefully how to lay down his cards in a highly politicized probe which has already drawn in many high-level government officials and may yet ensnare more. Such speculation is beside the point. This indictment makes clear that Russians wanted to sway the election in Trump’s favor, but no firm case has yet emerged that Trump campaign officials knew or collaborated with those efforts. What we do know is that the Russian interference was not limited to the 2016 election; it started before, and continues still, according to the US intelligence community. I think, therefore, that the other plausibility – which we should not rule out simply due to political sensibilities and suspiciously coincidental behavior by campaign officials – is that the 2016 election simply presented an ideal playing field for Russia, given its unconventional, chaotic, and already extremely divisive nature.

A final point to keep in mind regarding these indictments is that the White House has still not been moved to action on dealing with the continued threat that Russian political intervention poses. Trump’s initial reaction was to distance himself from the indictments by highlighting the lack of evidence of collusion, and he did not immediately address the serious and unique allegations the DoJ made against Russia, a political adversary, for crimes committed against the US. The White House has even tried to shift attention away from Russia by blaming Democrats and the media, as usual. Trump has always been uniquely cozy with Russia, and un-critical of Putin, but his continued refusal to acknowledge the scope and depth of the Russian intervention into American politics does seem strange, especially if his campaign was, as he claims, just an unwitting pawn in Russia’s larger game.

Unrelated to the Russia indictments but important to the Russia investigation, Mueller has also released a profusion of new charges against former Trump campaign chairman Paul Manafort and Rick Gates, Manafort’s business partner and former deputy campaign chair. Last fall the men were indicted for laundering money that Manafort had received working for former pro-Russian Ukranian President Viktor Yanukovich. After Yanukovich fled to Russia in 2014, Manafort and Gates seem to have devised a scheme to make more money by lying to banks about income and assets in order to secure loans and mortgages. It is this bank and tax fraud that Mueller’s new charges are based on. The new charges, like the original ones, are not directly connected to Trump or the Trump campaign, and seem to be intended to increase pressure on Manafort and Gates to cooperate with other aspects of the Russia investigation. Recent reports indicate that Gates is already cooperating with the special counsel, and may be close to a plea deal, which would put even more pressure on Manafort, whose trial is set for the spring. Gates has reportedly been in plea negotiations for about a month.

Special Counsel 

The special counsel’s recent activity has not been limited to the Russia indictments and Manafort charges. Reports indicate that Mueller has been interviewing other campaign and White House officials, including former White House chief strategist Steve Bannon. Bannon has reportedly met with the special counsel several times over the past few weeks, stirring speculation about his cooperation with Mueller’s investigation. Bannon is also in the midst of a legal battle with the House Intelligence Committee over his refusal to testify. He had previously been subpoenaed by the special counsel and made a deal with Mueller to avoid grand jury testimony. The special counsel also interviewed former Trump legal spokesman Mark Corallo last week, and is reportedly planning to interview early Trump campaign adviser Sam Nunberg this week.

Reports about specific people or things that the special counsel is investigating are numerous and probably misleading; aside from knowing whom Mueller interviews and when, there is very little reliable public information about the many directions his investigation is taking. That said, over the past month he has reportedly been looking into suspicious Russian financial transactions in the US, even prior to the election; money laundering; Russian banks; and Jared Kushner’s financial ties. The Russia investigation is moving quickly and in many directions, and is certainly following the money. The special counsel also brought a new prosecutor on board: Ryan Dickey, who joined the team after leaving the DoJ’s computer crime and intellectual-property division, and specializes in prosecuting cyber crimes.

White House vs. DoJ Update

My last post focused on the escalating conflict between the White House and the Department of Justice, as the House Intelligence Committee            released an inflammatory memo about the FBI, which the President used to bolster his claims that the Justice Department was biased against him and his campaign. The memo was decried by members of the intelligence community and congress, who alleged that it was intentionally misleading and omitted important circumstantial facts. After an internal battle, the House Intelligence Committee’s Democratic minority released their own counter-memo, which they say provides a more complete picture of the Republicans’ charges, centered around a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court application which cited intelligence from the controversial Steele memo. However, to date the President has refused to sign off on the Democratic memo’s public release, citing security concerns stemming from a plethora of classified material. Last week Deputy AG Rod Rosenstein met with Trump to discuss the memo’s declassification, and House Intelligence Committee ranking member Adam Schiff met with the FBI to discuss redactions, which he said he will freely make if deemed necessary by legitimate security concerns. Schiff has argued that unlike Nunes’ memo, the Democratic one had already been seen and preliminarily vetted by the FBI and DoJ prior to being sent to the wider Committee and the President, and that Trump is suppressing it because it undermines the elements of the Nunes memo he had claimed as ‘vindication’ in the world of the Russia investigations. Republicans, on the other hand, have accused Schiff of purposefully including information he knew would need to be redacted, in order to make it seem like the White House is trying to suppress information. Regardless, the Democratic memo presents a tricky political situation for the administration, especially given their strained relationship with the Justice Department. On one hand, releasing the Democratic memo could reveal embarrassing inconsistencies in the Nunes memo and make the White House look bad for standing by it; on the other hand, the justification for releasing Nunes’ memo was public transparency, and clearly releasing only one (partisan) side of the story and suppressing the countering narrative even further politicizes the entire issue. Now that the underlying intelligence matter – the FISA warrant application and the intel it was based on – was declassified, barring specific details there seems little legal justification for not declassifying the rest of the relevant information that the Democrats and DoJ provided, and letting the public judge for themselves whether there was bias or malfeasance. Schiff has predicted the memo’s imminent release, telling reporters last week that Committee Democrats and FBI/DoJ officials are nearing an agreement on redactions. However, the President still has ultimate and wide-ranging authority over the memo’s contents, should he choose to release it, so it is not unlikely that the White House will try to use redactions to create their own narrative spin.

DoJ & FBI 

Aside from the recent indictments, there has been a flurry of activity within the Justice Department as well as the special counsel investigation. Driven in large part by the outspoken criticisms from the White House, the DoJ and FBI have had a few significant staff changes in the past few weeks. One of the most notable shakeups was the resignation of Deputy FBI Director Andrew McCabe, who had been the subject of Presidential recriminations for months. FBI Director Christopher Wray had reportedly been pressured by Trump to fire McCabe, and had also reportedly discussed demoting him ahead of an anticipated DoJ Inspector General report which is expected to be critical of the FBI’s handling of the Clinton email investigation in 2016, for which McCabe may have had a potential conflict of interest stemming from a donation by a Clinton ally to the earlier political campaign of McCabe’s wife. The circumstances surrounding McCabe’s resignation are confusing, but it does seem that pressure from above played a role in his departure. Hiring decisions at the FBI and DoJ have become incredibly politicized, and Wray himself is in a difficult situation with the President. An Acting Deputy, the next-in-line official at the FBI David Bowdich, has taken McCabes place.

Last month Wray also replaced two top aides: FBI Chief of Staff James Rybicki and General Counsel James Baker. There had been reports circulating that Wray had also been under pressure from the White House to make some staffing changes, and Rybicki had been questioned earlier in the month by the House Oversight and Judiciary Committees about his role in the Clinton email investigation and his knowledge of the circumstances around former FBI Director James Comey’s firing. Wray stated that Rybicki had decided to leave on his own. Rybicki is succeeded by Zachary Harmon, a former prosecutorial colleague of Wray’s. The former FBI General Counsel James Baker was also involved with some of Comey’s decisions during the Clinton and Russia investigations, and was replaced by Dana Boente, who briefly served as Acting AG and Deputy AG during the Trump transition.

At the Justice Department, the third-ranking official also resigned. Associate AG Rachel Brand left the DoJ, reportedly due to uneasiness about ongoing vacancies and instability at the department. Media reports circulated that Brand also feared the possibility that she would be forced to take charge of overseeing the special counsel investigation; she and the DoJ have refuted them. Deputy AG Rosenstein, who is currently in charge of the Russia investigation, has also faced harsh criticism from Trump recently, and given the president’s record of attacks on his Justice officials, concern from the next-in-command at the DoJ would certainly be understandable.

In the midst of these shakeups, the President’s faithful Attorney General Jeff Sessions has called for a ‘fresh start’ at the FBI, citing lack of public trust in the Justice Department and intelligence institutions, aided by the White House’s attacks on their credibility. Along with the high-profile resignations, pressure has been mounting on Director Wray as well, so we can probably expect the saga of DoJ instability and White House hostility to continue.

The FBI has been playing an important and to date somewhat understated role in investigating certain aspects of Russian intervention and potential collusion. Last month reports indicated that the FBI is currently assessing a second dossier concerning the Trump-Russia connection. According to a report by The Guardian, the FBI was given a memo written by a former investigative journalist, Cody Shearer, which independently makes some of the same assertions as the infamous Steele dossier. The Bureau reportedly received Shearer’s memo in 2016 from Steele himself, after they asked him for additional documents related to his dossier. The FBI is seemingly still looking into the Shearer documents, leading to speculation that some of the information they contain corroborates parts of the Steele dossier – parts of which the FBI, in turn, had previously verified independently. The Steele dossier contains many damning allegations regarding collusion, so corroboration from additional sources and intelligence is extremely significant. Shearer is described as a “controversial political activist” and has ties to the Clinton administration. Thia could provide prime fodder for conservatives looking to undermine his research, should it be verified or brought into the broader Russia investigation, although Shearer reportedly had a substantial global network of sources as well as financial independence in pursuing his research, and there is no evidence that his memo was commissioned, sought out or used politically.

In other dossier-related news, former FBI and White House cybersecurity official Anthony Ferrante has reportedly been working for the past 6 months with a team from Buzzfeed to independently verify parts of the Steele dossier. Buzzfeed, who originally published the dossier, has been sued for libel by at least two people mentioned in the documents: Russian tech executive Alexej Gubarev, whose firm Steele alleged provided the servers Russia used to hack the DNC during the 2016 campaign; and Trump’s personal lawyer Michael Cohen, who was alleged to have acted as a sort of middleman for communications with well-connected Russians. The investigation is being run by a Washington business advisory firm called FTI consulting, who is working on behalf of Buzzfeed to prove that parts of the dossier are true in order to vindicate the news company from the libel charges. Foreign Policy reported that the FTI team initially only focused on investigating the allegations related to the lawsuits, but then expanded its scope to try to confirm other parts of the dossier as well. The dossier, and the FBI, are so politicized that it’s hard to tell whether independent external verification of some of Steele’s findings would even lend the document more credibility, but if Buzzfeed is able to use FTI’s research in court it could give the dossier’s contents wide-ranging implications in the Russia probe, especially if other research backs up parts of the document as well.

Senate Intelligence Committee

Last week the Senate Intelligence Committee held an annual hearing on worldwide threats, during which they heard testimony from the nation’s top intelligence organizations. The chiefs of those organizations unanimously delivered warnings about Russia’s continued interference in US politics, and their expected targeting of the 2018 midterm elections. In presenting their global threat assessments, intelligence officials told the Committee that they expect Russia to escalate its interventions, focusing on hacking and social media manipulation. National Intelligence Director Daniel Coats warned that the US political system is increasingly threatened by Russian cyber attacks and exploitation of social and political issues on social media. The testimony from intelligence organizations highlighted the lack of inter-agency coordination and responsibility in responding to this type of threat. Democrats on the Committee underscored the need for a united governmental response, which seems unlikely if not impossible given the executive branch’s refusal to acknowledge the ongoing Russian interference and the President’s ongoing feud with the Justice Department.

This blog was written by Stella Jordan. If you have comments on this blog, contact stella@usresistnews.org.

Last week, national news was dominated by the explosive revelations of new indictments and developments in special counsel Mueller’s investigation. Former Trump campaign chairman Paul Manafort and his close business associate Rick Gates were indicted on 12 counts related to their financial connections and work lobbying for foreign entities–including Russian-allied former Ukranian president Viktor Yanukovich–for which they received large sums of money which were allegedly laundered through a network of offshore accounts to avoid taxation and hide the international business connections. The indictments include conspiracy against the United States, money laundering, and failure to register as foreign lobbyists, among other charges. Following the indictments, Manafort and Gates surrendered to the FBI and pleaded not guilty, and are both currently under house arrest on multi-million-dollar bonds.

Despite the outcry it caused, Manafort’s indictment was no surprise to those following the Russia investigations; last month reports revealed that when the FBI raided Manafort’s home over the summer investigators had told Manafort to expect an indictment–the raid itself found evidence Manafort had withheld from the DoJ–and what little is known about Mueller’s aggressive pursuit of documents up to now certainly indicated that he had been closing in on Manafort. Aside from being an expected development in the special counsel’s investigation, it is important to note that the indictments target Manafort and Gates’ business activities prior to the 2016 election and do not directly relate to Manafort’s work on Trump’s campaign, or to the question of collusion between campaign officials and Russia–a point the White House has emphatically underscored.

However, just hours after news of the indictments broke, another bombshell, much more damaging to the presidency, was released by the special counsel: the news that George Papadopoulos, a former Trump campaign foreign policy adviser, had pleaded guilty in October to lying to the FBI and had reportedly been cooperating with Mueller’s investigation. Papadopoulos’ plea involved communications he had with people acting on behalf of the Russian government during the campaign, which he concealed from the FBI when first questioned. In April Papadopoulos had been offered, via email, allegedly damaging information about Hillary Clinton from someone he thought was close to Putin. He tried repeatedly to set up a meeting between campaign officials and Russian representatives, even reportedly suggesting that Trump meet with Putin prior to the election. Although the White House has said that Papadopoulos was only a low-level volunteer, he revealed in his plea that he did attend at least one important campaign foreign policy meeting with Trump and now-AG Jeff Sessions, among others, at which he brought up the possibility of connecting with Russian intermediaries to obtain information, and was rebuked by Sessions. So far it seems that Papadopoulos’ attempts to set up a meeting were unsuccessful, although Salon reported that after Papadopoulos began cooperating with investigators an email of his was found from right before the Republican convention, in which he said the campaign had approved a pre-election meeting with Russian officials. This information was not part of his plea, which suggests that prosecutors either thought it was false or wanted to look deeper.

Other campaign officials were also aware of Papadopoulos’ attempts to communicate with Russians; his supervisor was national co-chairman Sam Clovis, whose presidential nomination for chief scientist at the USDA was withdrawn after the recent news. Perhaps most importantly, the meeting Papadopoulos detailed in his plea–at which he tried to bring up the possibility of communicating directly with Russian officials–was also attended by Jeff Sessions, which puts Sessions in an awkward position with regards to what he had previously told lawmakers about his knowledge of campaign communications with Russia: nothing. Congressional investigators are now calling on Sessions to testify again.

The FBI obtained Papadopoulos’ communications with Russian contacts, ensnaring him in a previous lie, and arrested him the day after they raided Manafort’s home at Mueller’s behest. Papadopoulos’ plea–combined with the information known about Donald Trump Jr’s infamous Trump Tower meeting–clearly indicates that Russian operatives, seemingly acting directly on behalf of the Kremlin, had offered help in the form of opposition information to multiple Trump campaign officials, at least some of whom took the bait. It’s not yet clear if and how the campaign actually received or used any information from Russia, but the more we learn the more conceivable the question of collusion becomes.

Aside from the headline-grabbing Manafort and Papadopoulos news, the past 2 weeks have seen many other important developments in the Russia investigations: the Senate Judiciary, Senate Intelligence, and House Intelligence Committees all held highly anticipated public hearings last week for representatives of Facebook, Twitter, and Google–the tech giants whose platforms were used by Russian propagandists to deepen social and political divisions among voters during the 2016 election. The hearings centered on the question of how far the false and divisive posts spread and what impact they may have had on voters, and the issue of regulating political advertising on social media and the companies’ failures to promptly identify and address the Russian activity on their platforms. More on these hearings below.

DoJ & Special Counsel

In the wake of the indictments and plea news, there has been much speculation about Mueller’s intentions, what other information he has, and where he and his team plan to go next. Little is known about the extent of Papadopoulos’ cooperation with the special counsel, although it has been widely theorized–with no evidence–that the DoJ had him wear a wire while he was still in contact with campaign officials. The White House has also apparently voluntarily given all of Papadopoulos’ campaign emails to the special counsel. Whatever information Papadopoulos has about who else in the campaign was aware of his communications and attempts to set up a meeting with Russian officials is undoubtedly important to Mueller’s case, and perhaps the key question is whether the campaign actually obtained any concrete information from Russian contacts and if so how it was used and by whom. Many analysts believe that Mueller deliberately timed the release of the Manafort indictments and shortly afterward the news of Papadopoulos’ plea in order to catch other campaign and administration officials off guard, and to indicate that cooperation with the DoJ (like Papadopoulos’) is pragmatic, while obstruction (like Manafort’s) is met with swift indictments. Furthermore, the case against Manafort and Gates does not directly relate to the Trump campaign, while Papadopolous’ plea implicates senior campaign officials and even Trump himself–which leads to further speculation that Mueller may still be trying to get more information out of Manafort regarding his work on the campaign and potentially even implicate other campaign officials. Even if Manafort and Gates were to receive a presidential pardon, the case Mueller has built against them–primarily financial–could easily be taken up and prosecuted by state attorneys, who aren’t subject to federal pardons. It is unlikely that this is the last we will hear of Manafort in the world of the Russia investigations.

The reaction to the special counsel’s investigative developments was swift and partisan. Democrats lauded the news about Manafort and Papadopoulos as important indicators of campaign criminality and unleashed a flurry of unfounded speculation about the particulars of the special counsel’s case. Republicans reached again for the familiar scapegoat of Hillary Clinton, dredging up an old and unsubstantiated conspiracy about an Obama-era uranium deal–irrelevant to the Russia investigations–and seizing on last week’s revelations about the DNC’s funding of the Steele Dossier, with White House chief of staff John Kelly even calling for the appointment of a separate special counsel to investigate Clinton and the DNC.

There is some relevance to the Steele dossier’s background, and the dossier itself remains an intriguing and potentially important part of the Russia investigations, although the timing of the Republican outcry over the dossier’s funding seems rather opportunistic. Last month we learned that the dossier was originally commissioned as opposition research, first by a Republican Trump opponent, and after the nomination by Democrats. Last week the details became more clear after Fusion GPS, the firm that produced the dossier, was forced to release client information: the research was originally funded by a conservative/libertarian news site which opposed Trump’s candidacy, and the bill was later picked up by the DNC, who paid indirectly via a proxy law firm. Clinton was reportedly unaware of the DNC contributions to Fusion GPS, and other top Democrats apparently didn’t know about the dossier until after the election. Before its public release, Steele’s research was of interest to the FBI in their investigation about the Russian hacking of the DNC; the concerns about the dossier’s funding are legitimate insofar as they relate to the DoJ’s use of information funded by a political party to build cases against that party’s opponents–one example raised by Republicans is the FBI’s use (while Obama was still in office) of Steele’s research to obtain a FISA warrant to surveil former Trump campaign national security adviser Carter Page. However, the US intelligence community had separately echoed the dossier’s main findings in their own report–that Putin had deliberately ordered a campaign to interfere with and influence the 2016 election through a variety of means including social media, for the purpose of destabilizing our electoral process and undermining public faith in our democracy, with a clear intent to damage Clinton’s campaign and a preference for candidate Trump. The dossier also alleges that the Russian government fed information to Trump’s campaign, and although this has not been otherwise verified, emails from Papadopoulos and Donald Trump Jr indicate that at the very least attempts were made.

Another recently reported development in the special counsel’s investigation is an NBC story alleging that Mueller is poised to bring charges in the Michael Flynn investigation, according to 3 sources “familiar with the investigation.” Flynn has long been a key character in the Russia investigations due to his work on behalf of foreign governments and his short and controversial tenure as Trump’s national security adviser. Mueller has reportedly been interviewing Flynn’s former colleagues and associates, as well as investigating Flynn’s son, who played an important role in the family’s business dealings. Many speculate that Mueller is using Flynn Jr as bait to compel the elder Flynn’s cooperation.

Another important character in the Russia investigations is Jared Kushner, who Mueller’s team has reportedly been investigating for his role in and knowledge of the Trump Tower meeting and Comey’s firing. Kushner, who had already provided documents to congressional investigators, has reportedly been turning over documents voluntarily to the special counsel over the past few weeks.

With so much public attention on the special counsel’s investigation following last week’s news, some Republican lawmakers have renewed their calls for Mueller to resign, over alleged ‘conflicts of interest.’ House Speaker Paul Ryan pledged that Congress wouldn’t interfere in Mueller’s investigation, and the White House has also said it will not try to remove the special counsel. There are currently bipartisan bills being proposed in both chambers to protect the special counsel from executive interference.

Senate Judiciary Committee

The Senate Judiciary Committee was the first congressional committee to hold a hearing for Facebook, Twitter, and Google representatives last Tuesday, via their Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism, which has been spearheading the Committee’s Russia investigation. The House and Senate Intelligence Committees heard from the tech companies the following day. The extent of the Russian activity on social media is astounding, and investigators are still trying to understand the breadth and depth of the online interference. During the Judiciary Committee’s hearing, Facebook told investigators that Russian content on its platform reached around 126 million Americans, and Twitter revealed that in just 2.5 months leading up to the election around 1.4 million tweets were generated by Russian bots. Hundreds of millions of Americans across all 3 social and search platforms could have been exposed to Russian content prior to the election. The companies’ testimony also revealed that Russian activity–at least on Facebook–continued long after Trump’s election, with a shift from highlighting divisive issues to trying to delegitimize the presidency and sow further discord among voters.

The hearings didn’t really satisfy lawmakers; it has proved almost impossible for the companies and the investigators to determine the extent of Russian influence through social media on voter perceptions and on the ultimate outcome of the election, and Committee members were especially frustrated by the tech firms’ failure to identify potential threats leading up to the election, and their delayed reaction even after. However, given the size and power of the three companies in question, justly policing their content seems an almost impossible task as well. The hearings highlighted the companies’ inability to truly monitor the vast amount of rapidly shifting advertisements that flow through their sites; political advertising on social media is very difficult to keep track of, given the ease with which entities–i.e. foreign governments–can set up shell corporations to pay for ads, which themselves can fly under the radar amidst the massive volume of other advertising. Beyond the technical difficulties of monitoring the sources of advertising, the companies must walk a fine line between policing potentially dangerous networks and impinging on freedom of expression–especially being perceived as taking political or partisan stances regarding content regulation. There has also been very little conversation among lawmakers and government regulators until now about supervising political advertising and activity on online platforms such as social media, which have not been subject to the same regulatory mechanisms and scrutiny as conventional media. This is sure to be an issue which will prompt more discussion regarding regulation and legislation in the future.

Senate Intelligence Committee

There’s not much more to add about this Committee’s conversation with the tech companies, which yielded similar results to the Judiciary’s. A notable update on the Senate Intelligence Committee’s investigation is chairman Richard Burr’s revelation to reporters that his committee has also been investigating George Papadopoulos, and has had “constant contact” with Papadopoulos’ legal team since his plea deal. Burr said that the Committee is looking at different aspects of the case than Mueller’s team, and apparently hasn’t yet spoken with Papadopoulos. Manafort is also a central character in the Senate Intelligence Committee’s investigation, which has been working parallel to the special counsel’s.

House Intelligence Committee

The House Intelligence Committee held 2 important interviews last week: former Trump campaign national security adviser Carter Page, who has also been under investigation by the DoJ, was interviewed privately for almost 8 hours last Thursday, and reports indicate that later that day investigators also met with Ike Kaveladz, a Russian businessman who attended the Trump Tower meeting. Mike Conaway, who has been leading the Committee’s Russia investigation in the absence of chairman Devin Nunes, told reporters that the Committee’s interview with Page was productive, but although Page answered investigators’ questions he still hasn’t completely cooperated with the Committee’s document subpoenas and didn’t say whether he intended to. During the interview Page also told the Committee that in July 2016 he went to Russia to give a speech at a university–the trip was apparently completely unrelated to his activity on the campaign–but prior to leaving he told Jeff Sessions about the trip in passing. Although Page and Conaway both said the conversation was brief and irrelevant–then and now–to the campaign and the Russia investigations, any Trump campaign officials communicating with, doing business in, or traveling to Russia during the campaign are bound to face scrutiny from investigators, and insignificant as it may be this is yet another piece of information implicating Sessions. The Committee is still waiting for more documents from Page.

Another person the House Intelligence Committee is eager to interview is Trump’s longtime former bodyguard Keith Schiller. Schiller accompanied Trump to Moscow in 2013 for the Miss Universe pageant, during which the Steele dossier alleges that Russians obtained ‘compromising information’ about Trump’s behavior. Schiller also hand-delivered the letter President Trump wrote firing James Comey, which investigators will likely also want to discuss. Schiller left the White House in September, reportedly after becoming frustrated by chief of staff John Kelly’s management style.

Evidently, the Committee–at least the GOP membership–is still very interested in the Steele dossier, and Committee Republicans are still embroiled in a legal battle with Fusion GPS. Committee chairman Devin Nunes had previously subpoenaed Fusion GPS for information regarding its clients and finances, and Committee members are reportedly still trying to subpoena the company’s financial records and client list, even after Fusion worked with clients to reveal the Steele dossier’s funders and original backers. The company sought a temporary restraining order against their bank to stop House investigators from gaining access to their financial records, saying these had nothing to do with the Committee’s Russia investigation and handing them over would compromise Fusion’s business and client relationships. The Committee claims it is looking more broadly than the dossier, although it isn’t clear how the firm that commissioned the dossier is otherwise relevant to their investigation. The judge overseeing this conflict has urged both sides to reach an agreement, reportedly saying she was very reluctant to interfere with the Committee’s investigation, but that their subpoena did seem unduly broad.

This blog was written by Stella Jordan. If you have comments on this blog, contact stella@usresistnews.org.